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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays that contribute to the empirical literature
on the economics of violent conflict. More specifically, this work analyzes
socio-economic consequences of conflict involvement which is often overseen
next to the direct monetary cost of war. The first essay studies the effect of the
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the following civil war on schooling outcomes
of Iraqi children in mandatory schooling age. Several conflict measures which
vary over geographic regions are proposed to capture different traits of conflict
involvement. A special focus is laid on overcoming the potential endogeneity
arising from non-random involvement into conflicts. I find decreased school
enrollment of six-year-old boys and girls. Depending on the intensity of the
conflict enrollment of girls is reduced by six to twelve percent. The detrimental
effect measured for boys ranges between one and nine percent. The second
essay examines wage differentials of high-skilled workers in relation to relaxing
and tightening conflict intensity in the Israeli-Palestinian case. Contrary to
previous research which uses data from the 1980s, I find increasing returns to
schooling for Palestinian workers. After the outbreak of the Second Intifada in
2000 the relative wage of skilled workers experiences a substantial increase.
This work identifies regional employment shifts coming along with a change
in the sector composition to be responsible for a higher skill-intensive labor
employment which translates into higher relative wages for skilled workers.
The local service sector is found to play an insuring role in the Palestinian
labor market. The third essay explores the evolution of the gender wage gap in
the Palestinian Territories. While the male-female wage differential increases
till 1999, this trend is reversed with the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The
catch-up of the female wages can be explained by both, changes in relative
labor prices as well as changes in the composition of employed labor. Price
effects in favor of women can be found in returns to schooling, occupation
and industry affiliation. The bigger share of the narrowing wage gap, however,
can be explained by relative employment shifts across workplaces and sectors.
The shift from employment in Israel to employment in the local labor market
explains 57.8 percent of the closing wage gap between men and women. The
related change in the industry structure explains another 26.5 percent of the
wage convergence. Analyzing demand changes with the tightening of the
political conflict I find a sharp increase in female labor demand. Examining
the role of workplace-sector shifts in explaining labor demand changes I find
relative gains of the service and agricultural sectors located in the Palestinian
Territories, both of which rely on high shares of female labor input.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen, die zur empirischen Literatur
der Ökonomie des gewaltsamen Konfliktes beitragen. Es werden dabei sozio-
ökonomische Konsequenzen der Verwicklung in Konflikte untersucht, welche
oft hinter die Betrachtung der unmittelbar monetären Kosten von Kriegen
zurücktreten. Der erste Artikel untersucht den Einfluss der “Operation Iraqi
Freedom” und des folgenden Bürgerkrieges auf die Beschulung von irakischen
Kindern im schulpflichtigen Alter. Mehrere regional variierende Konflikt-Maße
werden vorgeschlagen, um verschiedene Züge von Konfliktverwicklung abzu-
bilden. Einen Schwerpunkt der Studie bildet die Überwindung eines Endogeni-
tätsproblems, welches sich durch nicht-zufällige Verwicklung in Gewalt ergibt.
Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass in Abhängigkeit von der Intensität des
Konfliktes die Schuleinschreibung von Mädchen durch eine Verwicklung in
Konflikte zwischen sechs bis zwölf Prozent reduziert wird. Der bei Jungen
gemessene Effekt beläuft sich auf eine Reduzierung um ein bis neun Prozent.
Im zweiten Artikel werden Lohnzuschläge von hochqualifizierten palästinen-
sischen Arbeitskräften in Zusammenhang mit alternierender Intensität im
Nahostkonflikt gestellt. Im Gegensatz zu früherer Forschung, deren Ergebnisse
auf Daten aus den 80er Jahren beruhen, finde ich steigende Bildungsrenditen
für palästinensische Arbeitnehmer. Nach dem Ausbruch der Zweiten Intifada
im Jahr 2000 steigen die relativen Löhne der gut ausgebildeten Arbeiter erheb-
lich an. Als Ursache dafür werden die regionale Verschiebung und die damit
einhergehende sektorale Umschichtung der Arbeitsallokation identifiziert. Die-
se verläuft zugunsten des Dienstleistungssektors in den Besetzten Gebieten,
welcher anteilig mehr hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte beschäftigt als andere
Sektoren. Die positiven Beschäftigungseffekte für Hochqualifizierte erklären
somit den Anstieg ihrer relativen Löhne. Im dritten Artikel wird die Ent-
wicklung des Geschlechterlohndifferentials in den Palästinensischen Gebieten
untersucht. Während der Lohnunterschied zwischen Mann und Frau bis 1999
ansteigt, lässt sich mit dem Ausbruch der Zweiten Intifada die Umkehrung
dieses Trends verzeichnen. Sowohl eine Änderung der relativen Arbeitspreise
zugunsten von Frauen als auch eine veränderte Zusammenstellung der Arbeit
ermöglichen den Anstieg der relativen Löhne von Frauen. Preiseffekte zuguns-
ten von Arbeitnehmerinnen sind sowohl bildungs- als auch berufsgruppen-
und sektorspezifisch. Der Großteil der sich schließenden Lohnlücke zwischen
Mann und Frau lässt sich jedoch aus einem Kompositionseffekt, d.h. aus ei-
ner Verschiebung des Arbeitseinsatzes über Berufsgruppen und Industrien,
erklären. Die Verlagerung des palästinensischen Arbeitseinsatzes aus Israel in
den lokalen Arbeitsmarkt erklärt dabei 57,8 Prozent der schrumpfenden Lohn-
lücke. Die damit im Zusammenhang stehende veränderte Industriestruktur
macht weitere 26,5 Prozent der Lohnkonvergenz aus. Mit der Verschärfung
des politischen Konflikts wird ein Anstieg in der relativen Arbeitsnachfrage
nach weiblichen Arbeitskräften gemessen. Um diesen zu erklären, wird die
Verlagerung des Arbeitseinsatzes über die Sektoren und die Einsatzregion, d.h.
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Israel oder die Palästinensische Gebieten, untersucht. Die Arbeitsallokation
verschiebt sich zugunsten der Agrar- und Dienstleistungssektoren, welche sich
beide durch einen hohen Anteil an weiblichen Beschäftigten auszeichnen. Die
Beschäftigungseffekte zugunsten von Frauen wiederum spiegeln sich in einer
Aufwärtsbewegung ihrer relativen Löhne wider.
Schlagwörter:
Arbeitsmarktökonomie, Konflikt, Krieg, Bildungsrenditen, Hochqualifizierte, relati-
ves Arbeitsangebot, relative Arbeitsnachfrage, Lohnunterschiede zwischen Mann
und Frau, Geschlechterungleichheit
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If he doesn’t understand the economy, he doesn’t understand security.
Joseph Stiglitz
1 Introduction
1.1 Economics of Violent Conflict
Taking a wide historical perspective the world has never seen less people dying
in violent conflict than nowadays. In 2012, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) recorded 32 violent conflicts. These are five registered conflicts less than
in the previous year (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013). And yet, political conflicts
carried out in different parts of the world are present in our lives on a daily
base. In contrast with historical wars, contemporary conflicts often globalize.
They do so, because countries or smaller actors have strategic interests in political
and economic conduct in other regions. Players, which are influential enough to
interfuse, will therefore try to affect political events such that their economic and
political objectives are retained. ‘Asymmetric wars’ describe conflicts which are
carried out by unequal conflicting parties, usually a national state and a smaller
group of resistance fighters. The modern armed conflict is characterized by a high
degree of asymmetry (Münkler, 2002) which leads to the phenomenon which we
observe more and more often: Conflicts do not end, sometimes even after the war
is officially declared over as in the case of Iraq. Figure 1.1 illustrates the recent
trend of armed conflicts which are increasingly intrastate and internationalized
intrastate.
Any asymmetric conflict, i.e. resistance against a powerful oponent, can emerge
in societies in which part of the population is feeling economically deprived or
socially marginalized on the base of cultural or religious identity (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004). Political leaders of the resisting group use these circumstances to
motivate group members to engage in militant forces. Leaders of national states
command over armed forces. In the case of democracies the order over entry in
conflict needs to be institutionally approved and therefore the public support. Both
sides, the national state and the resisting group, rely on ideological conventions
backed up in cultural allegiance to motivate the conflict engagement. However,
their tools of war conduct are very different. Each of the conflicting parties realizes
therefore a different cost when entering the conflict. The decision to fight is only
reasonable if the expected outcome is higher than the cost of conflict involvement.
Over the last six decades national governments of the Western world have enganged
in armed conflict mostly outside of their own territorries. Political decision-makers
of the Western democracies usually do not give economic reasons to justify these
1
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Figure 1.1: Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946−2012
Source: Themnér and Wallensteen (2013)
military operations, but rather refer to security concerns to find public support for
the costly interventions. The question which therefore arises is whether the gain in
security justifies the cost of war: The human costs are easily measured in terms of
soldiers who lost their lives in the battle. Assessing the economic costs is a more
complex task than it may initially appear. The direct monetary costs for Germany’s
participation in military missions abroad from 1992 till 2012 were e16.85 Billion.
This does not include the monthly pay for soldiers abroad as they are calculated
in the regular costs (Dewitz, 2013). Belasco (2011) calculated the cost of the U.S.
military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regions after the 9/11 at $944
Billion, 72 percent of which were dedicated to the realization of the Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Stiglitz (2008), however, estimated the true
cost of the Afghanistan war alone as high as $3 trillion. He draws attention to
hidden economic costs resulting from a decline in economic growth which comes
along with increased resource prices. He argues that the increased oil price after
the launch of the military operations in Afghanistan not only hampered economic
growth in the U.S. but also worked as a direct cash transfer from the U.S. to Saudi
Arabia. Murdoch and Sandler (2001) study the relation of economic performance
and civil war and find that economic growth is significantly hampered by civil
wars not only in the host country but also in neighboring countries. In a globalized
world, the economic consequences of a war are therefore difficult to foresee. They
largely depend on the duration of the conflict which in turn is unpredictable in
case of asymmetric war. Another distinguishing feature of asymmetric war is
that the military mission of the national state will be perceived as failed as long
as there is no conclusive battle that finishes the state of violence. It is therefore
a new interesting question for how long political leaders are able to keep the
conflict running without losing public support. Karol and Miguel (2007) investigate
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the electoral cost of the Iraq war on the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election. Using
changes in vote shares from 2000 to 2004 across states, they find that state-level Iraq
casualties significantly depressed George Bush’s vote share. There may, however,
be a general effect which works through the fear of an external threat and which
the President possibly used in his campaign to justify the war against the terror. If -
in contrast to war casualties - this psychological mechanism does not differ over
states and raises the consent to war, the military engagement in Iraq as part of the
fight against the ‘Axis of Evil’ may still have helped him to increase his vote share.
If it is the fear for our security that makes us enter in war we should get a good
understanding of what is threatening our security and how this will change if we
decide for military interventions. The following section will therefore explain why
it is necessary to understand the socio-economic consequences of violent conflict.
1.2 Understanding the Socio-Economic Consequences of
Violent Conflict
If Western democracies state that the ultimate interest lies in enforcing political
stability in conflict regions and therewith guarantee their own national security,
it is crucial to get an understanding of how these interventions shape those so-
cieties who experience violent force. A critical assessment of changes which
conflict-involved regions go through should not only reveal the impact of con-
flict involvement but also deliver a key for decision-making on further conflict
management. Adverse effects of armed conflict - such as economic depriviation,
reduced educational attainment, deteriorated health outcomes, political and social
imbalance - may serve as accelerators to further violence and thus counteract any
endeavor to enhance political stability and security. The literature on determinants
of violence is inconclusive in many aspects. Examining the role of education
and poverty, Krueger and Malecˇková (2003) and Berrebi (2007) find no evidence
that economic deprivation and a low level of education increase the likelihood to
participate in militant actions. On the contrary, they find that Palestinian suicide
bombers as well as militant Jewish underground fighters have a somewhat elevated
economic and educational background. These findings contrast the results from
cross-country studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
who find that income per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita and male secondary
school enrollment rate decrease the incidence of civil war. This macro-evidence is
further strengthened by micro-level studies on the Middle Eastern case provided
by Saleh (2004), Saleh (2009), Sayre (2009) and Miaari et al. (2013). Their results
directly constrast the findings of Krueger and Malecˇková (2003) and Berrebi (2007)
in finding that Palestinian aggression towards Israel is explained by economic
shortcomings. This brings us to the question of how much we can buy peace. In
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their cross-country study, Taydas and Peksen (2012) assess the provision of social
welfare services on the probability of onsets of civil wars. They find that welfare
spending successfully reduces violent conflicts. They argue that the “provision of
social services reduces grievances by offsetting the effects of poverty and inequality
in society”. Berman et al. (2011) address to the same question at the micro-level.
They investigate whether the provision of public goods in the aftermath of the
Operation Iraqi Freedom decreases violence in Iraq. They indeed find a negative
effect of improved service provision on insurgent attacks.
Next to economic and educational factors, some research finds the experience
of violence as such an important explanatory of further violence. Barber (2008)
analyzes the effects of exposure to political violence on long-term psychological, so-
cial, and civic functioning in Bosnia and Palestine. He concludes that the response
to experienced violence depends on the frequencies and degree of involvement
in political violence, as well as the perceived impact of the political violence on
daily life. He comments that Palestinians are more willing to actively involve
in the conflict than Bosnians. This might be rooted in humiliation and intrusion
which Palestinians experienced during conflict more frequently than Bosnians.
Jaeger et al. (2012) offer another study of the effect of experienced violence in the
Middle East. They use public opinion poll micro data of the Palestinian population
and data on fatalities from the Second Intifada to investigate the effect of Israeli
military actions on Palestinians’ support for militant factions. They find a short-run
radicalization effect that vanishes after 90 days. They, however, find stronger and
more persistent effects in case of collateral damage on civilians. They also state
differences in political preferences over birth cohorts which they attribute to the
political atmosphere during the time of adolescence.
If the political interest in the aftermath of a military intervention lies in stabilizing
the regions, reduce the duration of violence and thus effectively control the cost of
the operation, it is crucial to understand the impact of the intervention on civilians’
lives. Policies should then be developed to mitigate adverse effects which war-
exposed populations potentially experience during conflict. This work contributes
to the understanding of the socio-economic impact of conflict involvement with
three essays. The first one quantifies the impact of armed conflict on schooling
outcomes in Iraq. Education is found to be a substantial factor in promoting
economic development (see Becker et al., 1990; Barro, 2001; Fleisher et al., 2010).
The second essay dedicates to the skill premium in Palestinian Territories during
the Second Intifada. It is motivated by the idea that investment in human capital
should be rewarded sufficiently in order to provide incentives for individuals
to accumulate knowledge and thus increase their productivity. The third essay
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analyzes gender wage differences in the Palestinian Territories in the course of the
Second Intifada. Female labor force participation is a potential source for economic
development and is expected to increase with their relative wage.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This dissertation aims at giving empirical evidence on the socio-economic conse-
quences of violent conflict. These socio-economic consequences can be diverse. I
focus on schooling as well as on skill- and gender-specific labor market changes
under conflict exposure. Education and incentives to participate in the labor force
and increase labor productivity crucially determine the conditions for social and
economic development of the country. Understanding the consequences of armed
conflict for these growth determinants is important in developing policies directed
at improving economic development and political stability.
Chapter 2 summarizes the relevant literature on the economics of conflict involve-
ment with a specific focus on the socio-economic outcomes which are subject of
this thesis. I will outline the main findings in the respective strands of research and
discuss the applied methodologies. The critical assessment of former contributions
will serve as a base for the empirical analyses undertaken in this thesis.
Chapter 3 studies the effect of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the following
civil war on schooling outcomes of Iraqi children in mandatory schooling age. The
data base of this study is constructed from an Iraqi household survey conducted in
2007 which could be geo-matched to district-level information on war casualties and
counterinsurgent attacks. Several conflict measures which vary over geographic
regions are proposed to capture different traits of conflict involvement. Two macro
measures use geographic variation of conflict intensities. Additional measures
constructed from the household data identify different channels through which
conflict may affect schooling decisions. I apply a cohort difference-in-differences
technique which uses cross-sectional and cross-cohort variation in conflict involve-
ment and schooling outcomes under unchanged schooling law to identify the
causal effect of the violent conflict on schooling attainment in Iraq. Contrary to
most former research, special focus is laid on overcoming the potential endogeneity
arising from non-random involvement in conflicts. More precisely, I use the pre-war
district-level ethnic composition as an exogenous source of variation which is a
strong predictor for conflict involvement. I find decreased school enrollment of
six-year-old boys and girls explained by exposure to violence. Depending on the
intensity of the conflict, enrollment of girls is reduced by six to twelve percent.
The detrimental effect measured for boys ranges between one and nine percent.
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High security risk and experienced harm are identified as channels through which
violent conflict negatively influences early school enrollment. Relying on the 2SLS
estimates which control for non-random conflict involvement I estimate a decrease
in enrollment for girls by 14.2 percent and 10.4 percent decrease for boys if harm
has been experienced in the neighborhood. If the household itself suffered from
any kind of conflict-related harm the detrimental effect rises to 28.8 percent for boys
and 27.6 percent for girls. Also security risk reduces the probability of enrollment
at the age of six for girls over all specifications. Living in risky areas (security
risk 2) reduces school enrollment of females by 15 percent, living in very risky
areas (security risk 1) even by 20 percent. Boys’ school enrollment responds with a
decrease of approximately five or nine percent, respectively.
In all estimations the 2SLS estimates are substantially smaller than the OLS
estimates. This suggests the presence of a positive correlation of some unobserv-
able component and the conflict variables. The OLS estimates therefore largely
underestimate the detrimental effect of violence on schooling outcomes.
Chapter 4 investigates earning differentials between high- and low-skilled work-
ers in the Palestinian Territories from 1996 to 2006. Using quarterly information
from the Palestinian Labor Force survey, I can relate changes in labor market
outcomes to the tightening of the political conflict with the outbreak of the Second
Intifada. Contrary to findings from Angrist (1995) who finds decreasing returns
to schooling in Gaza and West Bank for the period of 1981 to 1991, which he
explains with the expansion of the educational system, I find increasing returns
to schooling for all years. Especially after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in
2000 the relative wage of skilled workers experiences a substantial increase. I use a
simple supply and demand framework that attributes changes in relative wages
of skilled workers to changes in their relative demand and their relative supply.
A strong relative demand growth dominates the relative supply growth in the
period before the Second Intifada. With the outbreak of the conflict in 2000 the
Palestinian labor market narrows down as a result of stricter border policies. The
supply of high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers declines in the Palestinian
labor market as a result of the squeezing in of low-skilled workers into the local
labor market. The relative demand keeps growing, but at a lower pace than in the
first period. The reduced relative supply is what drives up relative wages of skilled
workers. A variance decomposition later on reveals through which mechanisms
skilled workers profit from the changing labor market conditions. I find that the
increase in income generated by skilled labor after the year 2000 is a result of two
channels. First, a shift of employment from Israel to regions that are skill-intensive
(Gaza and West Bank). Second, an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers
in all three regions. The latter, in turn, results from a change in the allocation of
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aggregate labor across sectors. A sectoral decomposition shows that employment
shifts to the local service sector produce a substantial skill bias. Even though we
observe a general wage decrease after the escalation of the Al-Aqsa movement in
September 2000, tighter border closures hamper particularly low-skilled workers’
income opportunities and therewith increase the skill premium.
Chapter 5 explores the evolution of the gender wage gap in the Palestinian
Territories from 1996 to 2006. I find an increase of the unadjusted male-female wage
gap till 1999. Interestingly, this trend is reversed with the outbreak of the Second
Intifada. The catch-up of the female wages can be explained by both, changes in
relative labor prices as well as changes in the composition of employed labor. Price
effects in favor of women can be found in returns to schooling, occupation and
industry affiliation. The bigger share of the narrowing wage gap, however, can
be explained by relative employment shifts across workplaces and sectors. With
the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising the Israeli authorities intensify
border policies that hamper labor mobility of Palestinian workers. The shift from
employment in Israel to employment in the local labor market explains 57.8 percent
of the closing wage gap between men and women. The related change in the
industry structure explains another 26.5 percent of the wage convergence. Changes
in the relative price for female labor reduce the wage differential by 23 percent
- after controlling for compositional changes across sectors and compositional
changes of the workplace. The change in returns to schooling in favor of women
contributes 6.9 percent to the narrowing wage differential. The change in relative
prices on specific professional groups explains another 10.6 percent of the relative
wage gain of women. I furthermore explore how these strong dynamics relate to
changes in labor demand which come along with the tightening of the political
conflict. The overall demand for male labor is reduced over the Second Intifada.
On the contrary, the labor demand for women strongly increases. It is interesting
to note that more than half of the overall demand changes occur due to a between-
workplace demand change. Thus, a substantial part of both the decrease of the
demand for male labor and the increase of the demand for female labor, can be
explained by the limited work mobility across the Israeli-Palestinian border. This
is so, because in each sector the share of Palestinian women working in Israel is
substantially lower than the share of Palestinian men commuting. Examining the
role of sector-workplace shifts in explaining labor demand changes I find relative
gains of the service and agricultural sectors located in the Palestinian Territories,
both of which rely on high shares of female labor input. Sectors which sustain the
Palestinian labor market in times of political instability happen to be sectors with a
high intensity in female labor. Within the Palestinian society women seem to take
over secure jobs inside the Palestinian Territories which guarantee a constant but
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low pay relative to jobs held in Israel. Men, on the other hand, increase their pay
by commuting to workplaces across the border but risk zero pay in bad times. In
these periods the labor market activity of women gains importance in securing
households’ income.
2 Literature
2.1 Schooling under Violent Conflict
The body of literature that analyzes the impact of armed conflict on schooling
outcomes is constantly growing and for the time being covers a variety of conflict-
involved societies. The methodologies applied in those studies vary with the
available data.
Shemyakina (2011) uses a difference-in-differences approach to analyze the
regional and temporal exposure to the 1992 to 1998 armed conflict in Tajikistan.
Her data base is the 1999 Tajik Living Standards Survey combined with data on the
events during the conflict. She finds a reduced probability of mandatory schooling
completion in Tajikistan for girls, but not for boys.
Dabalen and Paul (2012) apply difference-in-differences and propensity score
estimation to estimate the causal effect of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire on schooling.
They use the Household Living Standards Survey (HLSS) of the year 2008 combined
with data on local incidences of conflict taken from the Armed Conflict Location
and Event Database (ACLED). The authors find between 0.2 and 0.9 fewer years of
schooling of conflict-involved individuals in Côte d’Ivoire.
Swee (2011) provides another case study using a difference-in-differences ap-
proach. He estimates the impact of the 1992 to 1995 Bosnian War on schooling
attainment. The author uses the 2001 to 2004 Bosnian Living Standards Measure-
ment Study (LSMS) and information on municipality-level war casualties. He finds
no strong impact of conflict involvement on primary schooling but a strong reduc-
tion in secondary schooling. Unlike the previously introduced studies, Swee (2011)
acknowledges the problem of a potential selection out of violence by adopting
a control function approach suggested by Heckman and Robb (1985). He uses
the pre-war municipality-level ethnic polarization indices as instruments for war
intensity.
Rodríguez and Sánchez (2009) use a duration model and a biprobit approach to
assess the effect of violent conflict on school drop-out and child labor in Colombia.
They use the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003 (ECV 2003) on individual-level
child information and municipal-level data on the total number of offensive actions
to proxy armed conflict. To account for a potential endogeneity of violence in a
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schooling equation they use lagged homicide capture rates in municipalities as
instrument. This is a disputable instrument if autocorrelation is high.1 Considering
children aged between six and seventeen they find that violent conflict in Colombia
increases school drop-out rates for the whole sample.
Alva et al. (2002) investigate consequences of ethnic segmentation in the 1990s in
Kosovo using an Oaxaca-type decomposition. Their research is motivated by the
existence of an informal educational system for Albanian Kosovars that appeared
next to the official one between 1991 and the late 1990s. The authors use micro data
originating from the 2000 Kosovo LSMS to assess the impact of the parallel system
on school enrollment and completed years of schooling. They find a decreased
secondary schooling for male Albanian Kosovars. This result parallels findings
from Swee (2011) and Chen et al. (2008). Similar to Swee (2011) in his above-
presented case study on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chen et al. (2008) observe a drop in
secondary (but not primary) schooling outcomes using cross-country data. Their
study comprises 41 countries which they follow over the period of 1960 to 2003.
They combine data on macro-economic indicators using different sources with
information on conflicts from the Armed Conflict Dataset of the Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO).
Contrarily, the macro study provided by Miguel and Roland (2011) finds no
robust negative effect of the U.S. bombing in Vietnam on economic variables
including the literacy rates. They use district-level economic indicators and U.S.
military data on bombing intensity to assess whether the war damage led to
persistent local poverty traps. In their instrumental variable approach they exploit
the distance to the 17th parallel demilitarized zone as an exogenous source of
variation.
Akresh and de Walque (2008) indicate that this finding might be an artifact of
the aggregated data. They conduct a micro study with data originating from the
1992 and 2000 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for Rwanda. They also
apply an instrumental variable technique - using distance to the Ugandan border
as an exogenous source of variation. The authors show that while enrollment rates
after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 are substantially higher, on the individual level
there is a significant gap between children who were involved in the genocide and
those who were not.
The empirical evidence on the effect of armed conflict on schooling outcomes
is thus not clear-cut. The effect of enforced violence on schooling decisions is
likely to vary from case to case. This lies in the diverse nature of each conflict.
Especially the length of conflict exposure, but also the degree of intensity and type
1See e.g. Berman et al. (2011) who find that violence in the past is the strongest predictor for current
violence.
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of conflict involvement (passive vs. active) are likely to determine whether violent
conflict exerts a detrimental effect on socio-economic outcomes (Barber, 2008). The
research presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis contributes to this strand of literature
with a case study on the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) started in 2003. To date,
no empirical assessment of the impact of the OIF and the following civil war on
educational outcomes has been undertaken. Western democracies have engaged
in this conflict with outstanding human and monetary resources. As argued
earlier, understanding the socio-economic impact of the military interventions
undertaken by the Western societies is crucial not only for understanding the
result of the decision to engage in conflict with respect to the current cost, but
also to get a perspective of social changes and therewith future costs. From a
methodological point of view, the analysis carried out in Chapter 3 addresses the
endogeneity problem which arises from non-random conflict involvement and is
largely ignored in many earlier contributions. Results from conventional estimates
will be contrasted to those which mitigate this type of endogeneity.
2.2 Skill Premium under Violent Conflict in the Palestinian
Territories
The Palestinian labor market and its dependence on the Israeli policies have been
studied intensively since the beginning of the 1990s. Among the most prominent
papers are the contributions by J. Angrist who studied the returns to schooling
for Palestinian men (Angrist, 1995) and short-run demand for Palestinian labor
(Angrist, 1996). In his first article, which is starting and reference point for a
number of further examinations on the Palestinian labor market, Angrist studies
the returns to schooling using Labor Force Surveys conducted in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip over the period of 1981 to 1991. His parameter estimates are derived
from simple wage regressions to capture changes in coefficients over years. He
complements these estimates with first-difference estimates which may control for
unobserved heterogeneity. He shows that between 1981 and 1987 wage differences
between schooling groups fell by one half.2 This sharp decrease in returns to
schooling is explained by a substantial increase of high-skilled workers in the
Palestinian labor force coming along with a strong educational expansion in the
Occupied Territories which started in the 1970s (Simon, 1988).
In his second paper, Angrist analyzes the wage premium of Palestinian men
working in Israel for the same observation period. He shows that the wage pre-
mium for working in Israel declined from roughly 17 percent in 1981 to zero in
2The first Palestinian Intifada broke out in 1987. An increase in returns to schooling is observed for
the years 1990 and 1991 only.
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1984 and then rose to 36 percent in 1991. He furthermore analyzes the relationship
of wages and days of work using simple OLS estimation. He can show that wages
paid to Palestinian workers in Israel are negatively related to their days worked in
Israel. To study the effect of demand and supply shocks on the wage dynamics
he adopts a labor market model with two skill-groups by Altonji and Card (1991).
He uses quarterly time series on curfews combined with civil disturbances data
collected by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as instruments for labor supply shocks.
He estimates the short-run Israeli demand for Palestinian labor controlling for sup-
ply shocks induced by curfews and closures. He finds that “exogenous decreases
in Palestinian labor supply are associated with significant increases in the wages
Israeli employers pay their Palestinian workers”. He thus concludes that a reduced
access to the Israeli labor market does not harm earnings of Palestinian workers too
much since the short-run Israeli demand for Palestinian labor is “inelastic enough”.
He, however, also notes that this result does not necessarily have to hold if the
border policies change.
Bulmer (2003), contrarily, finds that Palestinian labor market and welfare out-
comes are extremely vulnerable to the reliance on Israeli demand for Palestinian
labor in the long-run. She develops a theoretical model that links the Palestinian
labor market to the unskilled labor market in Israel. Her model incorporates the
availability of higher paid jobs in Israel for unskilled workers, costs and uncertainty
related to commuting and unemployment in the local labor market. She calibrates
her model using the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) of 1999. She predicts
that relaxed border policies between Israel and the Occupied Territories would de-
crease domestic employment and unemployment and that some wage gap between
domestic and Israeli wages would persist (reflecting commuting costs). However,
the draw of Palestinian workers to the Israeli labor market would result in an
upward pressure on wages paid in the local labor market, dampen domestic labor
demand and therefore hamper economic development in the Palestinian Territories.
Aranki (2004) and Miaari and Sauer (2011) study the impact of the Israeli border
policy during the Second Intifada.3 Aranki (2004) measures the impact of the
tightening conflict by border closures in percentage of days of closed borders per
quarter. He applies a two-step estimation technique proposed by Donald and
Lang (2007) to test for significance of the group-level variable of interest (closures).
He finds that increased border closures significantly reduce employment of Pales-
tinians (both locally and in Israel) as well as wages paid to Palestinians (in the
local and the Israeli labor markets). The detrimental effect is found to be stronger
in Gaza than in the West Bank. The author attributes this fact to differences in
3Aranki (2004) and Miaari and Sauer (2011) examine about the same period, 1999-2003 and 1999-2004,
respectively, both using the PLFS.
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the implementation of the closure policies in both regions. The Gaza Strip has
experienced stricter access control than the West Bank, the latter being controlled
with internal checkpoints and less external closures than the former. Miaari and
Sauer (2011) quantify the conflict by the frequency of border closures and the
number of foreign work permits issued by the Israeli government. Their fixed effect
estimates document a strong negative effect of the Second Palestinian Uprising
on Palestinian employment in Israel as well as on mean monthly earnings in all
three workplaces (Israel, West Bank and Gaza) and therewith confirm the findings
by Aranki (2004). Miaari and Sauer (2011) find a stronger effect for foreign work
permits issued than for border closures and argue that the latter represents a rather
transitory supply shock to the Israeli labor market while the former constitutes a
long-run impact through the substitution of Palestinian workers by foreign workers.
Benmelech et al. (2010) use a different measure for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
They investigate the impact of Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel during the Sec-
ond Intifada on unemployment and wages of Palestinian workers. They combine
data on suicide attacks between September 2000 and December 2006 with data
from the PLFS. Their empirical method relies on variation in suicide attacks at the
district-quarter level. They quantify that “a successful attack causes an increase of
5.3 percent in unemployment, increases the likelihood that the district’s average
wages fall in the quarter following an attack by more than 20.0 percent, and reduces
the number of Palestinians working in Israel by 6.7 percent relative to its mean. Im-
portantly, these effects are persistent and last for at least six months after the attack.”
The last four studies presented above do not specifically look at skill differences
of Palestinian workers across the different workplaces. I summarized their results
as they examine labor market outcomes during the Second Intifada, which is the
period of interest in the studies conducted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this
thesis. Mansour (2010) studies the effect of labor supply shocks as induced by the
Second Palestinian Uprising on labor market outcomes of low- and high-skilled
workers for the period of 2000 to 2004. He exploits within-city variation in the
number of workers from each city in the West Bank who report Israel as their usual
place of work. This number varies over time for reasons that are uncorrelated
with economic conditions at the city-level and which the author attributes to the
Israeli border policy. His fixed effect estimates suggest that unemployment of
low-skilled workers increases with an increase of low-skilled and high-skilled labor
supply. Also wages of low-skilled workers are negatively affected by increases
in supply in low-skilled and high-skilled workers. On the other hand, wages of
high-skilled worker seem to respond to increases in their own labor supply only.
He concludes that high-skilled workers compete for the high- and low-skilled jobs
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pushing low-skilled workers into unemployment.
Etkes (2012) studies the aftermath of the Second Palestinian Uprising, 2005-2009.
He combines data from the PLFS with Israeli administrative data on permits for
employment in Israel. The author shows a decrease in unemployment among
Palestinians with the relaxation of the political tension which is supported by an
employment increase in both the local and Israeli labor markets. He investigates
the distinguished impact of the permit policy on low- and high-skilled workers.
He shows that the number of work permits issued to Palestinian men is strongly
correlated with employment of low-skilled workers, but shows an insignificant
correlation with high-skilled employment. This, in turn, affects the schooling
premium. He quantifies that an increase in the number of permitted employees in
Israel by 100 reduces the return to schooling of Palestinian men by 13 percent.
The contributions presented so far show a negative impact of the intensification
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on labor market outcomes of Palestinian workers.
They also attest that Palestinian low-skilled workers profit from employment op-
portunities in Israel rather than high-skilled workers. Since wages paid in Israel
are generally higher than wages paid in the local labor market, the skill premium
decreases in times of conflict relaxation when employment chances across the
border are high.
The empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 4 builds on these earlier findings.
It expands the observation period over the years 1996 to 2006 and strives to add
to the literature in several ways: First, I examine the dynamics in returns to
schooling before and during the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Interestingly and contrary to findings from the 1980s, I find increasing returns to
schooling already before the Second Intifada. The increase in returns to schooling
is hence not only explained by border policies. Second, I use a simple demand and
supply framework to identify sources of changes in the relative wage of skilled
Palestinian workers. Third, applying a variance decomposition method I can
identify employment patterns at the sector level which are responsible for the
relative wage gain of skilled workers.
2.3 Gender Wage Gap Dynamics in the Palestinian
Territories
Inequality in wages between men and women is a high-ranked policy issue in
nearly every country in the world. It has, thus, been studied extensively for many
countries. Controlling for educational and other socio-economic gender differences
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- which strongly differ across countries - earlier literature found a substantial male-
female earnings gap which could not be explained and was hence attributed to
labor market discrimination (see e.g. O’Neill, 1985; Blau and Ferber, 1987; O’Neill
and Polachek, 1993).4 More recent literature finds that these unexplained wage
differentials are mainly driven by omitted variables and can be explained by differ-
ences in workplace and job characteristics (O’Neill, 2003), unobserved heterogeneity
and endogeneity (Kim and Polachek, 1994).
As a matter of fact, the gender wage gap has seen various changes throughout
recent decades that differ across countries. While developed countries experienced
no change (see e.g. Mussida and Picchio, 2013 on Italy) or a decrease in the gender
pay gap (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1997, and Bacolod and Blum, 2010, for studies
on the U.S.; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010, for an analysis of West Germany) the
trend in developing countries is less explicit. Cross-country comparison reveals
that whether the gender gap has closed or widened depends largely on the struc-
tural changes on the production side which, in turn, determine relative demand
for female labor. Rendall (2013) finds that wage disparities between men and
women are successfully reduced in countries which shift from “brawn”-intensive
to “brain”-intensive production. Research aiming at identifying driving factors
behind the catch-up of women’s wages in developed economies finds that tech-
nological change favored female employment and wages (see e.g. Blau and Kahn,
1997; Bacolod and Blum, 2010; Yamaguchi, 2013; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010).
The bottom line of this research can be summarized as follows: changes in the
occupational mix or in job tasks happened in favor of non-routine and analyti-
cal skills in which men - other than in motor skills - have no comparative advantage.
To the best of my knowledge only two studies examine the gender pay dif-
ferences in the Palestinian Territories. Daoud (2005) estimates the differences in
returns to schooling between men and women using the 1999 and 2001 PLFS. He
estimates alternative versions of the Mincerian wage equation using OLS and a
Heckman selection model. The author finds that women earn 14 to 15 percent
less in 1999. Between the years 1999 and 2001 - one year before and one year after
the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising - the estimated wage differential
declines which the author explains with a rise in male unemployment during the
Second Intifada. Keeping in mind the literature presented in the previous section,
this result is not unexpected. It is widely known that mainly male Palestinian
workers take the effort of commuting and profit from higher earnings across the
border in times of relaxed access policies. However, the decline in wage differences
4Stanley and Jarrell (1998) published a meta-study on the discrimination gender gap. They evaluate
55 studies and find a mean estimated gender gap of 31.8 percent. The range of those estimates
across studies is, however, quite considerable, ranging from 2.7 to 91 percent.
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is rather small. The author also finds that the schooling coefficients for women
decrease much stronger than the schooling coefficients for men over the two-year
period. A major weakness of the study is that it does not specifically address
compositional effects in the active labor force after the turmoil in September 2000.
The author himself notes: “One of the important changes between 1999 and 2001
is the change in industrial composition of Palestinian employment resulting from
lost access to certain industries.” He argues that by applying the Heckman esti-
mator without industry and occupation dummies he would solve that issue: “The
removal of the industry and occupation dummies is expected to reveal the true
effect of the Intifada on returns to schooling.” Losing control over wage differ-
ence between occupations and industries, however, does by no means improve the
wage estimation, nor does it allow to control for differences in compositional effects.
Daoud and Shanti (2012) analyze differences in private-public sector employment
and wage differentials in the Palestinian Territories from a gender perspective.
They follow an approach proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). This
counterfactual decomposition technique enables them to attribute differences in the
wage between two groups to differences in endowment and differences in returns.
They use the PLFS for the years 1999, 2001, 2007, and 2010. With descriptive
statistics they show several interesting facts. First, the share of public sector
employment increases after the Second Intifada. Even though this result is not
surprising, it should be kept in mind for the later analysis. Second, unemployment
rates of men increase while those of women decrease from 1999 to 2001. Third,
low-skilled men experience the most drastic rise in unemployment. Fourth, the
public-private sector wage gap for men is negative in 1999 and 2001 and positive
thereafter. For women it is always strongly positive. Fifth, women in the public
sector earn more than men while in the private sector they earn less. Sixth, the
average years of schooling of men employed in the private sector are higher than
of men employed in the public sector. The opposite is true for women.
In their empirical approach, the authors decompose the private-public wage gap
and the gender wage gap separately. The link between gender wage differential
and the role of sector employment remains therefore largely uncaptured. In their
sector decomposition they find higher predicted wages in the public than in the
private sector for men and women. This contradicts the initially presented evidence
on the unadjusted wage gap between sectors. They also report that men would be
overpaid and females underpaid in the public sector. The reliablility of this result,
however, crucially depends on the control for endowment-related differences. The
authors themselves state: “But overall, the endowment effect is dominated by the
residual effect (unexplained or discrimination) in explaining the wage differential.”
In their analysis of the gender wage gap they argue that the “wage is predicted to be
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higher for females in the public sector only, and that the endowment effect explains
a good portion of the difference”. In other words, it is likely that differences in
schooling explain a good part of the difference in wages between male and female
public sector employees. With their chosen empirical approach the authors cannot
explain the dynamics of the gender wage gap even though they look at several
years. The Oaxaca-Blinder between-group decomposition is static in the sense that
it decomposes wage differentials at a certain point in time, but it is not adequate
to analyze changes in these wage differentials.5 Additionally, it suffers from a
well-documented weakness in that it often attributes differences in endowment,
which are not controlled for, to differences in returns. This results from omitted
variables biases in the underlying wage regressions. The fact, that most of the
difference in their analysis of the wage gap remains unexplained as stated above,
elevates this concern.
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis takes these earlier
works as a starting point and aims at making several contributions. First, it provides
empirical evidence about the evolution of the gender wage gap in the Palestinian
Territories between 1996 and 2006. Second, it quantifies how much of the change
in the wage differential between men and women can be attributed to changes
in the composition of employed labor relative to changes in rewards to workers’
attributes. Third, it uncovers to which extent the gender-equalizing effect is driven
by sector-workplace shifts that can be related to the Second Intifada and the Israeli
border policies. And fourth, it identifies the sectors which secure the Palestinian
workforce and also those which favor relative demand for female labor. With the
identification of those sectors this work offers a key to develop policy measures
which stabilize the Palestinian economy which has been shown to be extremely
vulnerable to political distress in the past. It also pinpoints factors which favor
womens’ employment and should therefore be considered by any policy maker
who wishes to enhance gender equality.
5The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can inform about differences in time if the groups are defined
by the same group but at different time points. Then, however, differences between subgroups
(e.g. male vs. female) can no longer be evaluated.

3 Impact of Conflict Involvement on
Schooling in Iraq
3.1 Introduction
The Operation Iraqi Freedom brought the government of Saddam Hussein to a
quick end and sparked a long-lasting civil war. Even though Iraq has seen three
wars in only two decades, there has been little academic attention to the effect
that those conflicts have on the Iraqi people.1 In particular, empirical studies
that assess the effect of the recent armed conflict in Iraq on schooling outcomes
are rare and micro evidence is largely missing. At the same time, scholars have
increasing concerns about the impact of the violence in Iraq on schooling decisions
of housholds. Issa and Jamil (2010), Ranjan and Jain (2009) and de Santisteban
(2005) report full participation in primary schooling before the Gulf War I and huge
drops in schooling rates going along with increased child labor thereafter. They
show aggregated educational outcomes that allow no causal inference.2 This work
therefore aims at closing this gap.
One might argue that the destructive effect of wars gives rise to bigger concerns
than educational outcomes, such as mortality and health outcomes. However, when
it comes to developing strategies to rebuild an economy, investment in human
capital constitutes a facilitating factor (see Becker et al., 1990; Barro, 2001; Fleisher
et al., 2010). The political interest in the aftermath of wars lies in fostering political
stability. Berman et al. (2011) examine the provision of local public goods on
counterinsurgency in Iraq. They find a violence-reducing effect of aid flows that
establish public services. Following their results, the question is whether the
education sector is one that has been damaged. If this is so, investments that
build up the educational infrastructure will pay off in two ways: through a direct
effect on education and through the growth-generating effect on human capital.
Conflict involvement may affect child schooling in various ways. Parents possibly
prescind from sending their children to school for security reasons. Destruction
of infrastructure may lead to a rise in schooling costs. In addition, households in
1Guerrero-Serdán (2009) analyzes the effect of the recent war on child health outcomes. Berman
et al. (2011) dedicate their work to the aftermath of the civil war. They address the question of
whether financial aid is a successful tool to reduce insurgent violence.
2Schooling statistics are provided on a regular basis by the UNESCO and the Iraq Ministry of
Education.
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war economies are likely to face an aggrevated economic situation which increases
the opportunity cost for child schooling. Two major concerns constitute the focus
of this study: First, giving micro evidence on the impact of the Operation Iraqi
Freedom and the following civil war on child educational outcomes. Second,
the identification of channels through which armed conflict impacts schooling
outcomes. Both are important when developing policy strategies to foster recovery
from a war-ravaged economy with limited available resources. To the best of my
knowledge this work is the first contribution which empirically assesses the effect
of the recent violence in Iraq on schooling outcomes.
The body of literature that analyzes the impact of armed conflict on schooling
outcomes in other countries is constantly growing and for the time being covers a
variety of conflict-involved societies. The methodologies applied in those studies
vary with the available data. Shemyakina (2011), Swee (2011) and Dabalen and
Paul (2012) use difference-in-differences to estimate the effect of violent conflict
on schooling outcomes. Dabalen and Paul (2012) find fewer years of schooling
of conflict-involved individuals in Côte d’Ivoire. Shemyakina (2011) finds a re-
duced probability of mandatory schooling completion in Tajikistan for girls as a
consequence of violent conflict. Rodríguez and Sánchez (2009) use an instrumental
variable approach to assess the effect of violent conflict on school drop-out rates in
Colombia.3 Considering children aged between six and seventeen they find that
violent conflict in Colombia increases school drop-out rates for the whole sample.
Alva et al. (2002) investigate consequences of ethnic segmentation in the 1990s in
Kosovo using an Oaxaca-type decomposition. They find a decreased secondary
schooling for male Albanian Kosovars. This result parallels findings from Swee
(2011) and Chen et al. (2008). Swee (2011) follows a difference-in-differences ap-
proach using micro data on Bosnia and Herzegovina. He finds no strong impact
of conflict involvement on primary schooling but a strong reduction in secondary
schooling. Similarily, Chen et al. (2008) observe a drop in secondary (but not
primary) schooling outcomes using cross-country data. Contrarily, Miguel and
Roland (2011) find no robust negative effect of the U.S. bombing in Vietnam on
economic variables including the literacy rates. Akresh and de Walque (2008)
indicate that this finding might be an artifact of the aggregated data. They show
that while enrollment rates after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 are substantially
higher, on the individual level there is a significant gap between children who were
involved in the genocide and those who were not.4
3To account for a potential endogeneity of violence in a schooling equation they use lagged homicide
capture rates in municipalities as IV. This is a disputable instrument if autocorrelation is high. See
e.g. Berman et al. (2011) who find that violence in the past is the strongest predictor for current
violence.
4Akresh and de Walque (2008) use an instrumental variable approach using distance to the Ugandan
border as exogenous source of variation.
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This study examines the impact of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the following
war on enrollment and schooling completion of children in mandatory schooling
age. I use a cross-sectional micro survey to observe schooling outcomes of children
across different cohorts. Additionally I use two external data sources that provide
information on conflict intensities which are geo-matched to the household data at
the district level. I apply a cohort difference-in-differences approach which exploits
the variation in conflict-involvement on the one hand and observed differences in
schooling across regions and cohorts on the other hand. A potential selection into
violence in this field of research has been largely neglected in previous research.
I address this limitation using pre-war ethnicity data as an exogenous predictor
for conflict involvement. I find a strong reduction in school enrollment of conflict-
involved six-year-old boys and girls. This finding is robust to the incorporation
of the instrumental variable approach. I show that the effect of exposure to war
on schooling outcomes is substantially underestimated relying on the exogeneity
of the conflict measures. Protective behavior of the parents towards very young
children appears to be a major reason for the reduced school enrollment at the
beginning of mandatory schooling age.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The empirical estimation
strategy is outlined in Section 3.2. The data underlying the empirical work are
presented in Section 3.3. Estimation results are shown in Section 3.4. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Identification and Empirical Strategy
When assessing the effect of armed conflict the researcher ideally compares the
outcomes of interest before and after the outbreak of violence. This comparison
gives a good estimate of the impact of the conflict if the variables of interest do
not change over time due to other conditions than the conflict itself. This work is
concerned with the effect of the 2003 invasion and the following armed conflict in
Iraq on the allocation of child schooling. Using cross-sectional data collected in
2006 and 2007, I compare mandatory schooling outcomes across birth cohorts. The
identifying assumption for exploiting the variation in accumulated schooling is that
outcomes of birth cohorts whose schooling was affected by war would follow the
same trend as outcomes of earlier birth cohorts who could complete their primary
schooling in peacetime.
3.2.1 Identification Strategy on Exogenous Variation
The identification strategy uses the legal characteristics of the educational system
in Iraq. The Compulsory Education Law passed in 1976 regulates six years of free
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mandatory schooling which take place between the age of six and twelve.5 Two
types of schooling outcomes are analyzed in this work: enrollment and completed
mandatory schooling. Sample A is restricted to children who should have been
enrolled by 2006, i.e. children aged six or older. Variation from that norm as
regulated by law therefore reveals delayed schooling. Sample B in contrast contains
teenagers who should have completed their compulsory schooling by 2006, i.e.
they are at least thirteen years old. Thus, a common characteristic underlying both
samples is that the schooling variables of interest should be constant over cohorts.
Variation in enrollment and schooling completion between pre-war and war cohorts
thus allows us to draw conclusions about shocks that prevented children from
attending classes and obtaining their primary degree. At the same time, attention
has to be paid to the fact that Iraq has seen various wars over the last three decades.
As the purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of the 2003 invasion and the
following war, birth cohorts whose mandatory schooling could have been affected
by former wars do not serve as a control group and thus will be excluded from the
sample. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of violent conflicts in Iraq over the last
three decades which need to be considered in the sample construction.
Figure 3.1: Iraqi Conflicts, 1980 - 2006
Gulf War I
2003 200619881980 1990 1991
Gulf War II Operation Iraqi FreedomAnfal
1994 1998
Kurdish Civil War
Table 3.1 presents the composition of the samples used to identify cross-cohort
effects on schooling outcomes in this analysis. The samples are defined such that
various conditions are met. The samples are restricted to observations of boys
and girls, whose cohort characteristics of schooling are observed before or after
the 2003 invasion, and are not polluted by the other conflicts that the country has
gone through. Sample A concentrates on school enrollment. The pre-war cohort
contains children born between 1993 and 1996.6 This ensures that 1) the child
entered mandatory schooling age only after Gulf War II, 2) the child was at least
seven years old before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The war cohort in
5Several schooling laws were passed in the 1970s by the Ba’athist regime that enhanced gender
equality and promulgated free education at all levels. Schooling was made compulsory at the
primary level only. See e.g. de Santisteban (2005) and Issa and Jamil (2010).
6Since children born in 1996 and 1997 could belong to either group, those birth cohorts are excluded
from the analysis to avoid contamination.
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contrast contains all observations of children aged six in 2004 and 2005.7 Excluding
the Kurdistan region from the sample I can extend the pre-war birth cohorts till
1986. I do so to keep the sample clean from effects exerted by the Kurdish Civil
War.
Table 3.1: Identification in Different Samples
Sample A Sample B
Enrollment at Completed Mandatory Schooling
Primary Schooling Age beyond Primary Schooling Age
pre-war war pre-war war
Cohort 1993 -1995 1998 - 1999 1986 - 1989 1992-1993
Area All Iraqi Regions Iraqi Regions w/o Kurdistan
Cohort 1986 -1995 1998 - 1999
Area Iraqi Regions w/o Kurdistan
Sample B defines all children born between 1986 and 1989 to belong to the
pre-war cohort. This ensures that 1) those children are at least thirteen years old by
the start of the 2003 Operation (i.e. should have completed mandatory schooling),
2) they did all their mandatory schooling (aged six to twelve) during peacetime8
and 3) children of this group were covered by the same compulsory education law
as children whose schooling fell into the war period. Similarly, all children born
between 1992 and 1993 belong to the war cohort. Those children have experienced
at least one year of mandatory schooling during the period of interest and are at
least 13 years old when the interview takes place. Note that the Kurdistan region
is excluded if the completion of mandatory schooling is examined. As shown in
Figure 3.3 in the Appendix, the schooling outcomes of earlier birth cohorts are
influenced by the Kurdish Civil War.9 The Kurdistan region is therefore missing
a proper pre-war cohort and cannot be included in the difference-in-differences
analysis.
Legal educational regulations thus give rise to the possibility of assessing the
effect of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing civil unrest in the spirit of a
7Children aged six in 2006 are excluded since they could either be interviewed before enrollment or
- if born later that year - belong to the enrollment of 2007.
8Figure 3.1 shows the history of wars over the last three decades that need to be considered when
defining the cohorts of children that attended primary school in peacetime only. Schooling of
children born before 1986 could have been affected by the previous wars.
9De facto independence of the Kurdistan region after Gulf War II led to fights between the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) from 1994 to 1998.
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natural experiment. The estimation equation is specified as follows:10
Sijk = α+ β(Con f j ∗Wk) + Z′ijkζ + δk + µj + eijk (3.1)
where Sijk is the schooling outcome variable (enrollment or completed mandatory
schooling), µj are regional fixed effects at the strata level11, δk are cohort fixed
effects, Con f j is the ‘conflict measure’ described in detail in Section 3.3, and Wk
is a dummy indicating whether the schooling of a child born into cohort k was
exposed to conflict activity. The parameter of interest which estimates the effect
of conflict involvement on schooling outcomes is thus β. The baseline model
estimates the interaction effect of war and war cohort using regional and cohort
fixed effects. The set of control variables that complement the baseline model
comprises: mother’s age and its square, a dummy for being Kurdish, years of
schooling of the mother and the household head, dummy variables indicating
whether the child has younger siblings and an older brother and pre-war district
level income.
3.2.2 Endogenous Conflict Involvement
While Equation 3.1 intends to mitigate an omitted-variable bias with a strong set of
controls and by including regional fixed effects it disregards a potential endogeneity
of the variable of interest. It is likely that a selection into violence works along
individual characteristics. Those include the unobserved ability to migrate and
ethnic membership. I therefore use an instrumental variable approach that uses
pre-war district-level ethnicity data as an exogenous source of variation.12 The
identifying assumption underlying this estimation strategy is that the change in
schooling outcomes over cohorts are equal across ethnic groups in the absence
of war. More precisely, I predict the interaction of the war cohort and district-
level conflict intensities with interactions of war cohort and dummies for Kurdish
dominated, Sunni dominated and mixed regions.13 The first-stage regression is
10Similar models were used in earlier work. Shemyakina (2011) applied a baseline model without
controls to assess the effect of Tajik armed conflict on child schooling. Swee (2011) checks
robustness across five specifications with a fully augmented model including all controls specified
in Equation 3.1. These models were heavily influenced by earlier application of cross-sectional
difference-in-differences models by Esther Duflo in different research settings (see Duflo, 2001,
2003).
11There is a total of 54 strata. Each of the 18 governorates is divided into 3 strata (urban, metropolitan
and rural) plus two additional metropolitan areas in Baghdad.
12Ethnic population data come from the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) ethnicity data set.
Following Berman et al. (2011) I use indicators for dominant ethnicities if the share of that ethnic
group is bigger than 2/3.
13Regions dominated by Shia are the reference category. Berman et al. (2011) find Sunni and mixed
areas to be most conflict-intense.
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thus described by the following equation:
Con f j ∗Wk = α+ β1(Kj ∗Wk) + β2(Sj ∗Wk) + β3(Mj ∗Wk) (3.2)
+Z′ijkζ + δk + µj + υijk
where Kj, Sj and Mj indicate Kurdish, Sunni-dominated or mixed regions, re-
spectively. The other variables have been specified in Equation 3.1 which in this
estimation strategy represents the second stage using the prediction of the depen-
dent variable of Equation 3.2. On the one hand, ethnic composition is a powerful
predictor for violence (see Berman et al., 2011; Swee, 2011). On the other hand, the
interaction of pre-war ethnic composition and war cohort should be uncorrelated
with unobserved individual characteristics in the schooling equation. One might
suspect that ethnic membership may affect child schooling outcome even in the
absence of war. I therefore test for ethnic fixed effects in the schooling equation.
The estimates of the ethnicity dummies, however, turn out to be insignificant. This
suggests that there seems to be no other effect of ethnic membership on schooling
than the one through conflict involvement. This result was expected as the 1976
schooling reform set up an egalitarian system for children in mandatory schooling
age.
3.3 Data, Definitions and Descriptives
I use several data sources to combine information on geographical variation of
conflict involvement on the one hand and schooling outcomes of Iraqi children
and their socio-economic background on the other hand. The dependent variables
measuring child schooling outcomes and the individual controls such as age, family
background and geographical position are derived from the Iraq Household Socio-
Economic Survey 2006-2007 (IHSES 2007).14 The IHSES 2007 furthermore contains
questions about the households’ living situation in terms of conflict involvement.
I supplement the household information with macro data on conflict intensities
from two different sources. Fatality rates at the district level are calculated based on
leaked military documents which were published on WikiLeaks in October 2010.15
These data contain aggregated casualties as reported by Iraqi and U.S. military
forces between 2004 and 2009. Attacks against coalition forces at the district level
originate from Berman et al. (2011).16 Insurgent attacks are reported on a quarterly
14The IHSES 2007 is freely available through the World Bank’s Microdata Catalogue. The survey
was established with the goal to develop policies for poverty reduction and contains broad
information on economic activities of households, consumption behavior, health outcomes and
living standards.
15The Guardian datablog provides tables with casualty data elaborated from the Iraq War Logs.
16Berman et al. (2011) work with the Iraq War Data Set compiled within the ESOC
(esoc.princeton.edu).
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basis. I use population-weighted accumulated attacks between 2004 and the first
half of 2007.
3.3.1 Measuring Child Schooling
Schooling outcome of Iraqi children is measured in terms of enrollment at the
age of six as well as in terms of completion of compulsory schooling beyond
mandatory schooling age. Both variables are binary measures. The enrollment
variable takes on the value one if the observed child was enrolled at the age of
six.17 This indicator allows us to deduct information from younger cohorts whose
schooling is still taking place during the period of data collection and hence can
easily be connected to the constructed conflict measures. However, enrollment
is not a conclusive measure of successful educational attainment, but may just
indicate delayed schooling. Completed mandatory schooling can only be evaluated
on earlier birth cohorts and ultimately give information about schooling success. A
drawback of working with early birth cohorts linked to the conflict measures is a
potential increase in measurement error. Two variables for completed mandatory
schooling are generated: CMS1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
child has completed six years of mandatory schooling. CMS2 measures whether a
child earned a primary degree. Both variables are created only for children who
passed the mandatory schooling age.
Table 3.2: Schooling Outcomes across Cohort Groups by Gender
BOYS GIRLS
pre-war war difference pre-war war difference
enrol (whole) 0.9094 0.9346 0.0251 0.9177 0.9235 0.0058
enrol (no Kurd) 0.9145 0.9308 0.0163 0.9253 0.9178 -0.0074
CMS1 0.7521 0.7830 0.0308 0.6307 0.6549 0.0242
CMS2 0.6979 0.5540 -0.1439 0.6001 0.5439 -0.0563
The means of all outcome variables are shown for pre-war and war cohorts in
Table 3.2. Several facts are worth mentioning. First, all numbers are significantly
different from 1. This means that the Compulsory Schooling Law is not strictly
enforced. This is true even prior to the beginning of the Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Second, while enrollment rates are similar for boys and girls, completion rates
of primary schooling differ substantially across gender. While 75 percent of boys
17Enrollment at the age of six was analyzed on two subsamples, one of which includes and the other
excludes the Kurdistan region in the north of Iraq. Details are explained in Section 3.2.
N. Swed Chapter 3. Impact of Conflict Involvement on Schooling in Iraq 27
belonging to the pre-war cohort reached six years of education, only 63 percent of
girls complete the same amount of schooling years. Third, the share of children
who complete six years of schooling increases for children belonging to the war
cohort. Fourth, the share of children actually obtaining their primary degree is
substantially smaller than the share of children accumulating the compulsory six
years of schooling. This fact is observed for both sexes and across all cohorts. And
fifth, the share of male and female children who reach post-mandatory schooling
age without a primary degree is significantly higher for birth cohorts whose
mandatory schooling falls into the conflict period. Whereas boys belonging to the
war cohorts are 14.4 percent less likely to obtain a primary degree than their older
counterparts, the share of girls who conclude their primary education sucessfully
only declines by 5.6 percent.
3.3.2 Measuring Conflict Involvement
Any study assessing the impact of war on socio-economic variables depends largely
on the measure of conflict it uses. Various concepts to measure exposure to war or
involvement in conflict are possible, such as generated casualties, destruction of
housing or exposure to violence such as kidnapping, life threat and murder.18 Of
course, the accuracy of the measure crucially impacts the precision of any following
estimation. Errors in variables are likely to bias estimates in this type of study. In
the awareness of a potential measurement problem, this study uses eight different
measures of conflict. Two macro measures provide information on the variation of
the conflict intensity across regions. Six micro measures are constructed drawing on
information provided in the IHSES 2007. These measures check channels through
which households’ schooling decisions might be affected and tests the sensitivity
to changes in definition. Table 3.3 summarizes the conflict measures applied in this
work.
Two macro measures capture the variation of conflict intensity across Iraqi dis-
tricts. The first measure contains a population-weighted aggregate of casualties (see
Figure 3.2 in the Appendix). These data stem from the Iraq War Logs and aggregate
the deaths reported by US and Iraqi military forces between 2003 and 2009.19 The
second measure uses the number of recorded attacks. These data originate from
Berman et al. (2011). In this work I use population-weighted aggregates of attacks
launched between 2004 and the first half of 2007. Both macro variables are not
18Brück et al. (2010) discuss different concepts of measuring violent conflict and strategies of
identifying the impact of violence on socio-economic outcomes.
19The laborated data express time-aggregated entries. This means that I proxy the intensity of war in
2006/2007 by regional data counting deaths from 2003 and 2009. This works well only if places
of conflict do not change over time. Matching the Iraq War Logs statistics to the ISHES 2007 on
the governorates level is complete, on the district level only 12 out of 100 districts could not be
matched.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Conflict Measures
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Macro measures:
deaths 79163 1.46 2.05 0 26.08
attacks 106077 10.98 24.21 0 169.21
Micro measures:
harm_psu 127298 0.15 0.35 0 1
harm 127298 0.07 0.26 0 1
secr1_psu 127298 0.28 0.45 0 1
sec_risk1 127298 0.21 0.41 0 1
secr2_psu 127298 0.46 0.50 0 1
sec_risk2 127298 0.36 0.48 0 1
normally distributed. In order to capture the sensitivity of schooling response
along different conflict intensities I generate dummy variables that cut off the
conflict intensities at the 25th and 75th percentiles. This means I construct four
dummy variables: 1) the rate of district casualties is higher than the 25 lowest
percent deaths > p(25), 2) the rate of the district casualties falls into the upper 25
percent deaths > p(75), and 3) and 4) using rate of attacks rather than fatalities
with attacks > p(25) and attacks > p(75), respectively.
The micro measures are informative about channels through which conflict
involvement impacts schooling decisions. The first measure uses information on
whether at least one household member experienced some harm in the form of
kidnapping or violence due to the abnormal situation.20 The dummy variable
harm switches to 1 if the household answers positively. An alternative approach
uses household statements about their security risk on a four-unit scale.21 The
variable security risk 1 is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the household
reported to be largely affected by security risks. security risk 2 uses the same
information but sets the dummy variable to 1 if the household reports to be largely
20The relevant question is in Section 18 (risk). “Has any household member been adversely affected by
[...] the last twelve months?” checks among other things for “Violence due to usual circumstances
in Iraq” and “Kidnapping, threating to death, pertaining due to usual circumstances in Iraq”.
Individuals simply answer with “Yes” or “No”.
21The respective question is found in Section 3 (housing, E): “Is your household affected by security
risk?” Answers are given as 1 “Largely affected”, 2 “Little affected”, 3 “Very little affected” and 4
“Not at all affected”.
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or little affected. The two measures together therefore inform about sensitivity
to security risks. Finally, three additional micro measures are constructed by
aggregation of the aforementioned variables harm, security risk 1 and security risk
2 at the primary sampling unit level.22 The idea behind the aggregation is that
neighboring households, even though not directly affected are located in dangerous
areas.
How macro and micro measures correlate at the district level is shown in Table 3.9
in the Appendix. Note that the correlation between fatalities and insurgent attacks is
low and insignificant, probably due to the different length in the aggregation period.
However, both macro measures are significantly correlated with the household
responses on conflict intensity. Between both macro measures, the district-level
fatalities show much stronger correlations with the experience of harm or security
risk than counted district-level insurgent attacks.
3.4 Estimation Results
This Section presents the estimation results following the empirical strategy out-
lined in Section 3.2. I estimated the impact of conflict involvement on schooling
outcomes of Iraqi children of mandatory schooling age after the 2003 invasion and
the following civil war. I first present the impact of conflict involvement on enroll-
ment at the age of six followed by estimates on completed mandatory schooling. I
also address the problem of a possible endogenous treatment. Later in this Section
I examine some possible channels through which households’ schooling decisions
are influenced. Bertrand et al. (2004) pointed out that statistical inference using
difference-in-differences models is vulnerable to serial correlation that possibly
produces a downward bias in the standard errors. I therefore apply standard errors
clustered at the strata level to all estimates presented in the following Tables.23 The
following Tables present only the coefficient of interest. This is the treatment effect
calculated as the interaction of the conflict measure (reported in the beginning of
the rows) and the dummy indicating whether a child’s mandatory schooling fell
into a period affected by the conflict. In the following Tables columns (1) and (4)
display estimates of the raw difference-in-differences model. Columns (2) and (5)
include controls.24 The estimates from the instrumental variables approach are
presented in columns (3) and (6).
22The variable harm_psu, for example, is a dummy taking up the value one if at least one individual
in the primary sampling unit has experienced harm. This idea is adopted from Shemyakina
(2011).
23Block bootstrapped standard errors (not presented here) yield similar results.
24Population-weighted income in 2002 is used as district level control. Individual controls used
are education of the household head, mother’s education, mother’s age and its square, having
an older brother and having a younger sibling. (The gender-specific birth order seems to play
a role in households’ schooling decisions as elder brothers add more explanatory power to the
estimation than elder siblings.)
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3.4.1 The Impact of Conflict Involvement on School Enrollment
Each cell in Table 3.4 presents estimates from OLS and 2SLS regressions of the
coefficient of interest, the interaction of belonging to the affected cohort and living
in a high conflict region. I estimate the effect of conflict on school enrollment
using two subsamples: A shorter one that includes Kurdistan and a longer one
that excludes the Kurdistan region. I estimate the latter version as a robustness
check of the first one. Both samples are restricted such that observed child out-
comes are not influenced by other wars than the one of interest in this work.25
Raw difference-in-differences reported in column (1) for boys and in column (4)
for girls show no detrimental effect. Controlling for individual and district-level
characteristics in columns (2) and (5), the estimates decrease indicating a negative
effect of conflict intensity on school enrollment which is stronger for girls. 2SLS
estimates in column (3) show a clear negative effect of conflict involvement on
early-age school enrollment for boys. This effect is more pronounced in the sample
that excludes Kurdistan. For girls, a similar detrimental effect of conflict activity on
enrollment is found in column (6). The first-stage estimates of pre-war district-level
ethnic variables on conflict intensities are presented in Table 3.10 in the Appendix.
The ethnic composition of districts is shown to be a powerful predictor for all
conflict intensities. Kurdish-dominated districts are less likely to experience intense
conflict. Sunni-dominated districts and mixed districts record increased probabil-
ities of conflict. This parallels findings of Berman et al. (2011). Figure 3.4 in the
Appendix checks whether the parallel trend assumption is fulfilled. I plotted the
predictions of school enrollment at the age of six controlling for individual and
district-level characteristics, cohort and regional fixed effects. The pre-war plots of
the high-conflict and low-conflict groups indeed seem to follow a similar pattern.
Table 3.5 uses district-level population-weighted fatalities instead of attacks as a
measure of conflict intensity. Similar to the estimation outcome presented in Table
3.4, the OLS results for boys show no detrimental effect of high-conflict activity
on early school enrollment. The OLS results for girls are more pronounced. Girls’
enrollment seems to be more sensitive in the lower quartile of the conflict-intensity
distribution whereas boys’ schooling reacts stronger to the upper quartile of the
conflict distribution. Using pre-war ethnic composition at the district level as an
instrument for conflict involvement, the estimates are very similar to the ones
presented in Table 3.4. Again, the 2SLS estimates reported in columns (3) and (6)
are essentially lower than the OLS estimates and confirm a strong reduction in
enrollment rates. Household responses to conflict are now higher if the house-
hold is located in one of the 25 percent most conflict-intense areas for boys and girls.
25For details see Section 3.2.
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Table 3.4: The Impact of Attacks on the Enrollment at the Age of Six
BOYS GIRLS
War cohort
interacted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
All Regions
attacks >(p25) 0.0119 0.00748 -0.0190 -0.00570 -0.0232 -0.0865**
(0.0157) (0.0171) (0.0327) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0346)
[0.049] [0.058] [0.058] [0.047] [0.068] [0.064]
attacks > (p75) -0.0118 -0.0166 -0.0447 0.0111 -0.0194 -0.0904**
(0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0287) (0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0438)
[0.049] [0.058] [0.058] [0.047] [0.068] [0.065]
Regions excluding Kurdistan
attacks > (p25) 0.00589 0.000159 -0.144* -0.0196 -0.0293 -0.0734
(0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0791) (0.0228) (0.0218) (0.0827)
[0.084] [0.094] [0.084] [0.075] [0.094] [0.093]
attacks > (p75) -0.0280 -0.0290 -0.0571* -0.00543 -0.0164 -0.0377
(0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0310) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0306)
[0.084] [0.095] [0.094] [0.075] [0.094] [0.094]
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared in square brackets.
Regional and cohort fixed effects included. Controls included in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.5: The Impact of Fatalities on the Enrollment at the Age of Six
BOYS GIRLS
War cohort
interacted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
All Regions
deaths > (p25) 0.00682 0.00686 -0.0105 -0.0312 -0.0493** -0.0699**
(0.0153) (0.0191) (0.0322) (0.0190) (0.0222) (0.0301)
[0.049] [0.058] [0.058] [0.048] [0.070] [0.069]
deaths > (p75) -0.000852 -0.000806 -0.0537 -0.0112 -0.0177 -0.123***
(0.0137) (0.0153) (0.0418) (0.0180) (0.0211) (0.0383)
[0.049] [0.058] [0.055] [0.047] [0.068] [0.057]
Regions excluding Kurdistan
deaths > (p25) -0.00312 -0.00298 -0.0624 -0.0275 -0.0383 -0.0705***
(0.0308) (0.0318) (0.119) (0.0493) (0.0512) (0.0270)
[0.084] [0.094] [0.094] [0.075] [0.094] [0.094]
deaths > (p75) -0.0262 -0.0279 -0.0907 -0.00898 -0.00924 -0.0936**
(0.0178) (0.0183) (0.0586) (0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0410)
[0.084] [0.095] [0.092] [0.075] [0.094] [0.089]
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared in square brackets.
Regional and cohort fixed effects included. Controls included in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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To findings on the effect of conflict involvement using both district-level attacks
and fatalities as a proxy for conflict intensity can be summarized as follows: Girls’
enrollment rates respond stronger to high-conflict activity than boys’. The OLS
estimates seem to underestimate the impact of war on schooling outcomes. They
indicate no effect for boys and an about two percent reduction in early school
enrollment for girls. The 2SLS estimates which account for a potential endogeneity
in the conflict measures give rise to a six to twelve percent decrease in school
enrollment for conflict-involved girls if conflict intensity is proxied by fatalities, and
a four to nine percent decline if insurgent attacks are used as conflict measure. The
detrimental effect on boys is measured less precisely. Controlling for endogeneity
the estimates indicate a reduction in boys’ school enrollment that ranges between
one and nine percent if fatalities measure the conflict activity. The range of the
negative impact of war on enrollment is even higher when attacks are used to
measure conflict intensity. These estimates indicate a high sensitivity to both, to
conflict intensity (which is determined by different cut-off points in the distribution
of the war measures) and to the applied war proxy. Regardless of the sensitivity of
the point estimates, a detrimental effect of conflict involvement on school enrollment
of boys has been shown along all definitional modifications for both sexes.
3.4.2 The Impact of Conflict Involvement on Completion of
Mandatory Schooling
The results in Table 3.6 present estimated effects of conflict involvement measured
by district-level attacks on the completion of mandatory schooling. Successful
completion of mandatory schooling is measured in two ways. The upper panel
reports estimates on six completed schooling years. The lower panel reports results
on the attainment of a primary degree. Negative effects are found only on the
amount of years that boys spent at school. Surprisingly, the estimated effects
on the attainment of a primary degree turn out to be positive for boys and girls.
Relying on ethnic composition as a predictor for conflict, these positive effects
become very strong, particularly for boys. These results are confirmed by Table 3.7
which presents estimates calculated on district-level fatalities as measure of conflict
involvement. Mandatory schooling years of boys are reduced due to the Operation
Iraqi Freedom and the following war. However, there is no evidence of decreased
probabilities to achieve a primary degree on the basis of regional variation in conflict
intensities. Primary schooling of cohorts that were beyond primary schooling age
in 2003, thus are shown to be affected only in schooling years. This raises concerns
about the quality of schooling. It remains an open question, however, if younger
cohorts, that could be analyzed in data provided for later years than 2006, are still
shown to be unaffected in their attainment of a primary degree as the war goes on.
Furthermore, a general decrease in the probabilities to achieve a primary degree
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is shown in Figure 3.6 in the Appendix. As mentioned earlier, this decrease in
completed compulsory schooling is independent of conflict intensities. This hints
to economic reasons for a reduced completion of mandatory schooling. Ranjan
and Jain (2009), de Santisteban (2005) and Issa and Jamil (2010) point out that
mandatory schooling was successfully enforced before Gulf War I. Thereafter the
Iraqi economy suffered from the following wars and enhanced sanctions and never
recovered to the pre-Gulf War I level. If indeed economic conditions determine the
completion rather than violence-related concerns, this effect goes unmeasured by
the conflict proxies applied in this work. The identifying assumption would then
fail. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 in the Appendix check the identifying assumption of the
cohort difference-in-differences approach with completed mandatory schooling as
outcome variable. This time, most plots indicate a violation of the parallel trend
assumption. A common trend can be assumed for girls coding the upper quartile
of the conflict intensity distributions to one.26
26See panels (b) and (f) in both Figures.
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Table 3.6: Impact of Attacks on the Completion of Mandatory Schooling
BOYS GIRLS
War cohort
interacted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Completion of Mandatory Schooling (Six Years)
attacks > (p25) -0.0393 -0.0428 -0.0585 0.00854 0.0238 -0.189*
(0.0322) (0.0311) (0.160) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.112)
[0.078] [0.166] [0.166] [0.171] [0.286] [0.274]
attacks > (p75) -0.0356 -0.0487* -0.0160 -0.0145 0.0143 0.0204
(0.0233) (0.0266) (0.0756) (0.0243) (0.0249) (0.0800)
[0.078] [0.166] [0.166] [0.171] [0.286] [0.286]
Completion of Mandatory Schooling (Primary Degree)
attacks > (p25) -0.0170 -0.0192 0.459** 0.000893 0.0100 0.0502
(0.0247) (0.0264) (0.222) (0.0294) (0.0299) (0.162)
[0.110] [0.222] [0.170] [0.172] [0.308] [0.308]
attacks > (p75) 0.0299 0.0248 0.222* -0.00312 0.0334 0.0819
(0.0215) (0.0278) (0.113) (0.0247) (0.0305) (0.101)
[0.111] [0.222] [0.213] [0.172] [0.308] [0.308]
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared in square brackets.
Regional and cohort fixed effects included. Controls included in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: The Impact of Fatalities on the Completion of Mandatory Schooling
BOYS GIRLS
War cohort
interacted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Completion of Mandatory Schooling (Six Years)
deaths > (p25) -0.0105 -0.0230 -0.0198 0.0456 0.0186 0.164
(0.0384) (0.0332) (0.0684) (0.0503) (0.0463) (0.130)
[0.077] [0.166] [0.166] [0.171] [0.286] [0.283]
deaths > (p75) -0.0403* -0.0434* -0.0688 -0.00806 0.00984 -0.0822
(0.0222) (0.0232) (0.104) (0.0265) (0.0244) (0.0658)
[0.077] [0.166] [0.166] [0.171] [0.286] [0.283]
Completion of Mandatory Schooling (Primary Degree)
deaths > (p25) 0.0226 0.00769 0.0340 -0.0182 -0.0435 0.0588
(0.0552) (0.0555) (0.169) (0.0395) (0.0316) (0.0904)
[0.107] [0.222] [0.220] [0.172] [0.308] [0.307]
deaths > (p75) 0.0166 -0.00317 0.222 -0.0108 0.00289 -0.0177
(0.0254) (0.0274) (0.155) (0.0282) (0.0296) (0.0889)
[0.110] [0.222] [0.207] [0.171] [0.308] [0.308]
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared in square brackets.
Regional and cohort fixed effects included. Controls included in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.4.3 Identification of Channels
Schooling outcomes in war regions might be influenced by several factors. In-
frastructure and schooling facilities might be destroyed. Parents could hold back
their children from going to school for security reasons. Domestic household
tasks as well as market labor might shift over to children when households face a
tightened economic budget. In this section I analyze possible channels that affect
household decisions on school enrollment at the age of six. Since I am restricted
by the availability of survey information I can check for violence related items
only. Tables 3.8 and 3.11 present estimates of the interaction of children belonging
to the affected cohort and household indicators that inform about whether the
household has experienced harm during the last 12 months due to the abnormal
situation or whether the household is located in an area with an augmented se-
curity risk. Table 3.8 uses the shorter sample including all Iraqi regions. Table
3.11 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check to these results. It excludes
the Kurdistan region but extends the sample over earlier birth cohorts. In both
Tables, specifications control for regional and cohort fixed effects as well as for
individual and district-level characteristics. All estimates attest a negative effect of
experienced harm in the household or the neighborhood on schooling outcomes.
Relying on the 2SLS estimates which control for non-random conflict involvement I
estimate a decrease in enrollment for girls by 14.2 percent and 10.4 percent decrease
for boys if harm has been experienced in the neighborhood. If the household
itself suffered from any kind of conflict-related harm the detrimental effect rises
to 28.8 percent for boys and 27.6 percent for girls. Also security risk reduces the
probability of enrollment at the age of six for girls over all specifications. Note that
columns (1) and (2) display non-negative effects for boys. However, this effect turns
negative when applying the instrumental variables approach. In all estimations the
2SLS estimates are substantially smaller than the OLS estimates. This suggests the
presence of a positive correlation of some unobservable component and the conflict
variables. The OLS estimates therefore largely underestimate the detrimental effect
of an aggrevated security situation on school enrollment. The reported effects for
security risk at the household level and the neighborhood are more similar than
the effects of harm suffered by both entities. This makes sense, since security risk
perceptions are likely to be highly correlated amoung neighboring households.
How families assess security risk is more influential to girls’ schooling than to
boys’. Living in risky areas (security risk 2) reduces school enrollment of females
by 15 percent, living in very risky areas (security risk 1) even by 20 percent. Boys’
school enrollment responds with a decrease of approximately five or nine percent,
respectively. Note that the estimates reported in Table 3.11 show similar results.
However, the effects are even stronger if the Kurdistan region is excluded from the
sample yielding more comparable households.
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Table 3.8: Channels of Conflict on School Enrollment at the Age of Six
BOYS GIRLS
War cohort
interacted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
harm (PSU) -0.0264 -0.0206 -0.104 -0.0601*** -0.0692*** -0.142*
(0.0172) (0.0204) (0.0831) (0.0211) (0.0248) (0.0796)
[0.049] [0.059] [0.054] [0.050] [0.071] [0.068]
harm -0.0182 -0.0266 -0.288 -0.0759** -0.0765* -0.276
(0.0162) (0.0195) (0.237) (0.0369) (0.0398) (0.174)
[0.049] [0.058] [0.042] [0.049] [0.069] [0.060]
sec risk 1 (PSU) 0.0165 0.0207 -0.0818 -0.0304* -0.0269 -0.200**
(0.0128) (0.0149) (0.0671) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0794)
[0.049] [0.059] [0.050] [0.048] [0.068] [0.043]
sec risk 1 0.00974 0.00669 -0.107 -0.0227 -0.0200 -0.207**
(0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0818) (0.0153) (0.0183) (0.0810)
[0.049] [0.058] [0.050] [0.048] [0.068] [0.045]
sec risk 2 (PSU) 0.0239 0.0341** -0.0446 -0.0201 -0.0138 -0.146**
(0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0520) (0.0157) (0.0186) (0.0618)
[0.049] [0.060] [0.052] [0.048] [0.068] [0.046]
sec risk 2 0.0113 0.0192 -0.0624 -0.0213 -0.0202 -0.154***
(0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0567) (0.0143) (0.0169) (0.0590)
[0.049] [0.059] [0.052] [0.048] [0.068] [0.049]
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared in square brackets.
Regional and cohort fixed effects included. Controls included in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6).
Sample includes all Iraqi Regions. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.5 Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of the impact of the Operation Iraqi Freedom
and the following civil war on schooling outcomes of Iraqi children of mandatory
schooling age. I find strong evidence for reduced school enrollment of six-year-olds
for boys and girls. This finding is robust to the incorporation of an instrumental
variables approach that takes into account a potential correlation of unobserved
characteristics and the conflict variables applied in this work. Depending on the
intensity of the conflict enrollment of girls is reduced by six to twelve percent.
The detrimental effect measured for boys ranges between one and nine percent.
I find a substantial upward bias of the OLS estimates assessing the effect of
war on schooling. Relying on the exogeneity of conflict involvement as seen in
earlier work, therefore substantially underestimates the effect of war on schooling
outcomes. Protective behavior of parents towards very young children seems to be
a major factor in reducing enrollment at the beginning of mandatory schooling age.
Households who have suffered harm during the conflict or who live in high-security
risk areas are less likely to send their children to school. On the other hand, I find
no evidence of reduced mandatory schooling completion that can be explained by
district-level variation in conflict intensities. Instead I find decreased probabilities to
accomplish the mandatory primary degree for war cohorts independent of conflict
intensities. This could be a result of the deterioration of the Iraqi economy in which
the maintenance of the educational infrastructure meets budgetary limits not only
in highly violent regions. This could imply an increase in the cost of schooling - an
effect which goes largely unmeasured by conflict proxies capturing only variation in
violence. As due to data limitations this point could not be investigated in this work
further research should include other dimensions of conflict that take into account
the destruction of infrastructure and variation in regional budget constraints. If it is
true that the deterioration of the Iraqi economy as a whole explains why we observe
a decline in mandatory schooling completion without being able to specifically
relate this to high conflict intensity, another open question remaining for further
research is whether it is the households’ aggrevated economic situations which
change schooling decisions or simply the destruction of educational infrastructure,
both potentially raising the cost of schooling in addition to violence.
N. Swed Chapter 3. Impact of Conflict Involvement on Schooling in Iraq 40
3.6 Appendix
Figure 3.2: Variation in Conflict Intensity
(a) Relative Deaths at Governorates Level (b) Relative Deaths at District Level
Figure 3.3: Completion of Six Years of Schooling over Birth Cohorts
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Table 3.9: Cross-Correlations of Conflict Measures
Variables attacks deaths harm_psu harm secr1_psu sec_risk1 secr2_psu sec_risk2
attacks 1.00
deaths 0.18 1.00
(0.14)
harm_psu 0.22 0.51 1.00
(0.04) (0.00)
harm 0.24 0.48 0.86 1.00
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
secr1_psu 0.40 0.62 0.63 0.59 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
sec_risk1 0.37 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.98 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
secr2_psu 0.35 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.86 0.81 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
sec_risk2 0.33 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.92 0.89 0.96 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Conflict measures are mean-collapsed at district level. Significance level reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.10: First-Stage Regressions on Conflict Intensities
birth (1) (2) (3) (4)
cohort attack (p25) attack (p75) deaths (p25) deaths (p75)
BOYS
TW_sunni 0.203*** 0.445*** 0.0659*** 0.220*
(0.0468) (0.129) (0.0236) (0.112)
TW_mix 0.247*** 0.416 0.0745*** 0.595***
(0.0564) (0.280) (0.0278) (0.0709)
TW_kurd -0.600*** -0.200*** -0.707*** -0.299***
(0.0741) (0.0537) (0.0744) (0.0887)
age_mother 0.00838 0.000343 0.00481 -0.00641
(0.00552) (0.00295) (0.00465) (0.00405)
age_mother2 -8.70e-05 -1.06e-05 -5.60e-05 6.79e-05
(6.41e-05) (3.47e-05) (5.69e-05) (4.57e-05)
educ_mother 0.00799* -0.00470 0.00579** -0.00507
(0.00437) (0.00311) (0.00249) (0.00537)
educ_hhead 0.000307 0.000502 -0.00308 0.000205
(0.00281) (0.00194) (0.00244) (0.00219)
youngersibling 0.00671 -0.0116 0.00167 -0.000122
(0.00781) (0.00863) (0.00703) (0.0106)
olderbrother -0.00661 0.00177 -0.00118 -0.00273
(0.00642) (0.00487) (0.00564) (0.00674)
inc_2002_rel -8.41e-05 0.000148* -0.000119 0.000357
(0.000103) (8.68e-05) (9.22e-05) (0.000230)
GIRLS
TW_sunni 0.222*** 0.434*** 0.0769*** 0.200
(0.0506) (0.140) (0.0275) (0.125)
TW_mix 0.272*** 0.311 0.0822*** 0.554***
(0.0564) (0.313) (0.0305) (0.0769)
TW_kurd -0.528*** -0.186*** -0.708*** -0.315***
(0.0921) (0.0518) (0.0871) (0.0905)
age_mother 0.00690* -0.00284 -0.000863 0.00138
(0.00407) (0.00350) (0.00265) (0.00495)
age_mother2 -8.59e-05* 3.08e-05 8.44e-06 -1.73e-05
(4.78e-05) (4.02e-05) (3.11e-05) (5.50e-05)
educ_mother 0.00153 -0.00164 0.000945 -0.00455
(0.00358) (0.00183) (0.00240) (0.00544)
educ_hhead 0.00246 0.00237 0.000421 0.00218
(0.00225) (0.00168) (0.00159) (0.00309)
youngersibling -0.0137 -0.0111 -0.00952 0.00493
(0.00943) (0.00839) (0.00818) (0.0111)
olderbrother -0.00306 -0.00366 4.51e-05 -0.0104
(0.00750) (0.00485) (0.00359) (0.00870)
inc_2002_rel -0.000130 -5.41e-06 -0.000201 0.000176
(0.000135) (0.000112) (0.000142) (0.000204)
regional & cohort fe X X X X
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The sample is restricted to produce regression results of Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Enrollment at the Age of Six over Birth Cohorts by Conflict Intensities
(a) Attacks > (p75) (b) Attacks > (p75)
(c) Attacks > (p25) (d) Attacks > (p25)
(e) Deaths > (p75) (f) Deaths > (p75)
(g) Deaths > (p25) (h) Deaths > (p25)
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Figure 3.5: Completed Six Years over Birth Cohorts by Conflict Intensities
(a) Attacks > (p75) (b) Attacks > (p75)
(c) Attacks > (p25) (d) Attacks > (p25)
(e) Deaths > (p75) (f) Deaths > (p75)
(g) Deaths > (p25) (h) Deaths > (p25)
N. Swed Chapter 3. Impact of Conflict Involvement on Schooling in Iraq 45
Figure 3.6: Completed Primary Degree over Birth Cohorts by Conflict Intensities
(a) Attacks > (p75) (b) Attacks > (p75)
(c) Attacks > (p25) (d) Attacks > (p25)
(e) Deaths > (p75) (f) Deaths > (p75)
(g) Deaths > (p25) (h) Deaths > (p25)
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Table 3.11: Channels of Conflict on School Enrollment at the Age of Six
BOYS GIRLS
War cohort
interacted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
harm (PSU) -0.0342* -0.0318 -0.126 -0.0713*** -0.0788*** -0.0843
(0.0187) (0.0227) (0.0928) (0.0229) (0.0260) (0.0693)
[0.084] [0.095] [0.091] [0.077] [0.096] [0.096]
harm -0.0247 -0.0353 -0.296 -0.0799** -0.0816* -0.168
(0.0172) (0.0211) (0.240) (0.0375) (0.0405) (0.133)
[0.084] [0.095] [0.084] [0.076] [0.095] [0.094]
sec risk 1 (PSU) 0.0142 0.0137 -0.117 -0.0333* -0.0320 -0.135**
(0.0155) (0.0188) (0.0791) (0.0197) (0.0249) (0.0636)
[0.084] [0.095] [0.085] [0.076] [0.094] [0.088]
sec risk 1 0.00756 -0.000294 -0.131 -0.0232 -0.0233 -0.142**
(0.0138) (0.0164) (0.0899) (0.0161) (0.0191) (0.0610)
[0.084] [0.094] [0.087] [0.075] [0.094] [0.087]
sec risk 2 (PSU) 0.0314* 0.0379* -0.110* -0.0225 -0.0172 -0.0871
(0.0169) (0.0205) (0.0655) (0.0167) (0.0203) (0.0643)
[0.085] [0.096] [0.079] [0.075] [0.094] [0.090]
sec risk 2 0.0178 0.0230 -0.124 -0.0184 -0.0191 -0.101
(0.0131) (0.0172) (0.0791) (0.0154) (0.0185) (0.0615)
[0.084] [0.095] [0.081] [0.075] [0.094] [0.089]
Note: Standard errors clustered at strata level in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared in square brackets.
Regional and cohort fixed effects included. Controls included in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6).
Sample excludes the Kurdistan regions. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4 Skill Premium and the Second
Palestinian Uprising
4.1 Introduction
The Palestinian labor market is characterized by an interdependent relationship
with the Israeli labor market. The level of integration of both markets alters with
the intensification and the relaxation of the political conflict. Periods of higher
integration result in a narrowing wage gap between Israel and the Palestinian
Territories, increasing production outcome in Israel and reducing poverty in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The intensification of the political conflict, on the other
hand, translates quickly into detrimental effects in the Palestinian labor market.
Miaari and Sauer (2011) and Aranki (2004) find that increased border closures
during the Second Intifada reduce employment rates and earnings of Palestinian
workers.1 Etkes (2012) studies the aftermath of the Second Palestinian Uprising,
2005-2009. He finds that an increase in work permits issued to Palestinian workers
increases employment favoring Palestinian low-skilled labor. Angrist (1995) studies
the returns to schooling in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for the period of
1981 to 1991 and finds the rising supply of high-skilled workers to be responsi-
ble for the falling schooling premium. Extending the analysis to a more recent
period, however - which is done in the present study - leads to very different
results. Returns to schooling immediately after the Second Intifada show to be
increasing. With the tightening of the political conflict in the Middle East in the
year 2000 the skill premium sharply increases despite the continuing rise in tertiary
education in the Palestinian Territories. The supply side explanation therefore
fails to account for the rising wage differentials after the escalation of the Al-Aqsa
movement. Angrist (1996) examines the short-run Israeli demand for Palestinian
labor. He finds that a reduced access to the Israeli labor market does not harm
earnings of Palestinian workers too much since the short-run Israeli demand for
Palestinian labor is “inelastic enough”. He, however, also notes that this result does
not necessarily have to hold if the border policies change. Bulmer (2003), contrarily,
finds that Palestinian labor market and welfare outcomes are extremely vulnerable
to the reliance on Israeli demand for Palestinian labor.
1Aranki (2004) and Miaari and Sauer (2011) examine about the same period, 1999-2003 and 1999-2004,
respectively.
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This work aims at analyzing the impact of the change in the Israeli border policy
after the Second Intifada on the skill premium. It extends the existing literature
in several ways. First, it extends the period of analysis such that years before and
after the outbreak of the Second Intifada are covered equally. Second, I apply a
simple supply and demand model to estimate relative demand and supply changes
for skilled labor for the period before and after the intensification of the political
conflict. And third, using a variance decomposition I show how the relative alloca-
tion of skilled labor goes along with regional shifts. Those, in turn, correspond to
labor relocation across sectors which are characterized by different skill intensities.
I find that the relative increase in income generated by skilled labor after the year
2000 is a result of two channels. First, a shift of employment to the West Bank
and Gaza which use more skill-intensive Palestinian labor than Israel. Second,
an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers in all three regions. The latter
effect is explained by a skill-biased labor shift which occurs through a change in
the sectoral composition. More precisely, the gain in the relative wage of skilled
workers can be explained by a change in employment across sectors in favor of
the local service sector which yields the highest skill intensity. The skill-intensive
service sector, contrary to the other sectors, is less mobile and therefore does not
suffer a wage decrease induced by a return to the local market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data
used in this work. Section 4.3 estimates the return to schooling for each year in the
time period 1996 to 2006. Section 4.4 presents a theoretical framework that analyzes
changes in relative wages between two skill groups as a response to supply and
demand shifts. Section 4.5 examines to what extent shifts in relative employment
and relative wage bill share of skilled workers can be explained by changes in the
work location of Palestinian workers. Section 4.6 gauges the role of sectoral shifts in
explaining changing wage differentials between skill groups. Section 4.7 concludes
this work.
4.2 Data and Descriptives
The sample is restricted to working males aged between 26 and 65. Over the entire
period from 1996 to 2006 this yields 253,680 individual observations stemming
from 140,114 households. The data originate from the Palestinian Labor Force
Survey (PLFS) which have been collected by the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics (PCBS) since 1995. The survey design follows recommendations of the
International Labor Organization. Individuals are drawn on a quarterly base in
repeated rounds from a two-stage stratified cluster random sample. The accrued
N. Swed Chapter 4. Skill Premium and the Second Palestinian Uprising 49
Figure 4.1: Wage Dynamics over Years by Skill Group
Note: The wage trend for both skill groups is represented as the mean log real daily wage calculated
using PCBS sampling weights.
rotated panel covers 1/6 of the total sample in each round in all sample areas. As
income variable I use the real daily wage reported by Palestinian men working in
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or Israel (including Jerusalem).
Figure 4.1 pictures the dynamics of the real daily wage before and after the
Second Intifada for two skill groups. Apparently skilled workers do not have an
average wage premium in the nineties. Just as the conflict between Palestinians and
Israel culminates in September 2000 an average wage gap arises between workers
with and without tertiary education. Note, however, that the income variable
declines for both groups. The average skill premium comes therefore as a result of
the fact that low-skilled workers suffer a higher wage loss than skilled workers.
Table 4.1 summarizes important features of the sampled male population that
may explain these income dynamics. The estimates given here are obtained us-
ing the PCBS sampling weights. I find that years of schooling have increased on
average by one year over an observation period of 11 years only. This increase
in educational attainment translates into a higher share of skilled workers over
the years.2 One third of the sampled population lives in Gaza. The fourth and
2“Skilled” is a label attached to those persons who held a degree from tertiary education. This
simplified labeling does not express the author’s belief but simply follows the definition of
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Year Years of Skilled Living Working Real wage
schooling labor (in %) in Gaza (in %) in Israel (in %) (in NIS, daily)
1996 9.27 0.21 0.31 0.22 65.51
1997 9.27 0.21 0.34 0.24 66.57
1998 9.63 0.22 0.34 0.26 68.92
1999 9.86 0.23 0.32 0.27 70.58
2000 9.90 0.23 0.33 0.27 70.38
2001 9.96 0.23 0.33 0.22 58.83
2002 10.02 0.23 0.33 0.13 60.93
2003 10.08 0.23 0.33 0.13 55.98
2004 10.18 0.23 0.33 0.13 57.26
2005 10.16 0.23 0.33 0.13 57.87
2006 10.27 0.23 0.33 0.12 59.64
Note: Means are calculated for the period of 1996 to 2006 using PCBS sampling weights.
fifth columns show the effect of the Second Palestinian Uprising on the regional
labor markets. In the 1990s the share of workers who profit from the regional
integration of the labor market is still steadily increasing and ranges around one
quarter. With the beginning of the Al-Aqsa movement I find a 50 percent decline
in labor mobility. With the tightening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli
government intensified border closures. These political measures clearly affect the
average real wages of Palestinian workers. The earnings variable I use measures
the inflation-adjusted daily wage in New Israeli Shekel (NIS). While earnings have
been steadily increasing before the Second Intifada they experience a substantial
drop of approximately 15 percent with the aggravation of the conflict. Note also
that the average mean daily wage does not recuperate its earlier level until the end
of the observation period.
Table 4.2 presents the spread of labor incomes over groups of workers that
differ in both skill level and place of living. The picture found in Figure 4.1 does
not change when disaggregating the working population by their place of liv-
ing. Low-skilled workers experience a stronger decrease in labor income than
higher-skilled workers independent of the place of living. Still, for geographical
and political reasons the level of integration into the Israeli product and labor
market differs between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This leads to differ-
ent wage levels in both regions. Over the entire period wages are significantly
“skilled” used in existing literature.
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higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, interestingly,
the average wage of low-skilled workers is higher than the one of skilled work-
ers in the first half of the observation period. With the Al-Aqsa movement this
relationship is reversed. As shown in Figure 4.1, the wage loss of those without
tertiary education is substantially higher than of those who held at least a Bachelor
degree. In fact, the negative average mark-up for skilled labor before the Second
Intifada is a result of the labor market integration between Israel and the West
Bank. The Gazan numbers, in contrast, reveal a smaller negative wage gap between
high- and low-skilled labor before 2000 which is even positive in the first two
years. However, also in Gaza the wage gap is positive after the Second Palestinian
Uprising. Note also that it is much more pronounced than the one in the West Bank.
Table 4.2: Mean Wage in NIS by Skill Group and Place of Living
West Bank Gaza
Year No Bachelor Total No Bachelor Total
university or higher university or higher
1996 69.01 63.61 67.31 59.13 62.93 60.51
1997 70.98 63.53 68.74 61.24 63.19 61.84
1998 73.08 65.98 71.23 66.02 64.17 65.45
1999 73.96 68.31 72.53 65.85 64.53 65.44
2000 75.16 69.03 73.51 63.15 62.20 62.83
2001 63.11 60.17 62.21 41.19 55.16 47.64
2002 63.82 65.84 64.53 42.32 56.37 48.50
2003 60.05 61.12 60.44 41.30 53.98 46.12
2004 58.40 64.43 60.57 39.61 59.10 48.25
2005 59.05 64.12 60.57 39.60 59.27 47.96
2006 58.70 66.02 60.98 42.56 62.39 51.37
Note: Means are calculated for the period of 1996 to 2006 using PCBS sampling weights.
Table 4.3 links the income spread to the place of work. Palestinian men who
manage to cross the border earn on average 70 percent more than those working
locally.3 One can see that the relative wage gain from commuting is higher for
workers without tertiary education. Notice also that the drop in the daily wage
after September 2000 takes place in both schooling groups and in both regions.
However, Palestinian men working in Israel suffer a higher wage loss than their
3The average real daily wage over all years is 90.80 NIS in Israel and 53.56 NIS in the Palestinian
Territories. The calculation is based on sample restriction detailed in Section 4.2.
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Table 4.3: Mean Wage in NIS by Skill Group and Place of Work
Palestine Israel
Year No Bachelor Total No Bachelor Total
university or higher university or higher
1996 52.18 61.34 56.05 89.65 92.23 89.85
1997 51.32 60.58 55.06 91.93 93.11 92.03
1998 51.65 60.93 55.24 92.78 97.38 93.19
1999 52.33 62.68 56.27 92.95 97.14 93.31
2000 53.26 62.72 57.06 94.29 100.34 94.79
2001 49.25 57.28 52.65 78.62 80.96 78.76
2002 47.02 60.27 52.84 87.75 100.68 88.87
2003 44.07 57.32 49.61 86.63 93.25 87.03
2004 43.84 61.03 51.32 86.23 100.12 87.38
2005 43.90 60.74 50.48 85.64 91.69 86.18
2006 45.76 63.18 52.75 85.30 93.14 86.11
Note: Means are calculated for the period of 1996 to 2006 using PCBS sampling weights.
locally employed counterparts. Compared to the wage level of 2000, the respective
2001 wages of men working in the Occupied Territories are 92.47 percent for low-
skilled and 91.32 percent for high-skilled workers. Palestinian men who work in
Israel experience a wage drop to 83.38 percent of the 2000 wage level for low-skilled
and even to 80.68 percent for high-skilled workers.4
4.3 Returns to Tertiary Education over Time
The aggregate picture of a negative return to tertiary education before the Second
Intifada as depicted in Figure 4.1 changes when controlling for individual socio-
economic characteristics. Table 4.2 indicates that Gazans in contrast to West
Bankers profit from their university career already in some years before the Second
Palestinian Uprising. Table 4.3 gives evidence that skilled workers always earn
higher wages if the place of work is taken into account. The aim of this section
is to examine the dynamics of the returns to tertiary education over all years. I
therefore estimate the skill premium controlling for important socio-economic wage
4Note that this wage drop is based on aggregate descriptives of employed Palestinian workers. It
may be influenced by compositional changes. I will come back to this point later in this thesis. A
comparison to Israeli wages from aggregated statistics is not sensible due to the particular sample
restriction outlined in Section 4.2 and differences in the workforce composition.
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determinants as given by the following equation:
log(wit) = αt + βtSit +∑
c
γct Aic +∑
q
δqtQiq + λtGit
+φtUit + θtCit + ψt Mit +∑
d
κdtPWid + ε it
(4.1)
where variation in the logarithmic wage is explained by tertiary education (Sit),
four equally ranged age groups for males from 26− 65 (Aic), quarterly effects (Qiq),
a dummy for living in the Gaza Strip (Git), in an urban area (Uit), in a refugee
camp (Cit), being married (Mit) and two dummies indicating whether the place of
work is located in the West Bank or Israel (PWid). The reference population works
in Gaza. ε it is assumed to be exogenous but can be autocorrelated at the household
level.5 The coefficients of interest are βt which estimates the skill premium for each
year and κdt which states the effects of different workplaces over time.
Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients of the full sample in columns (1)
to (3). Splitting up the overall sample into three possible workplaces as done
in columns (4) to (6), the dynamics of the skill premium can be shown for each
region separately. Table 4.4 gives evidence on several interesting facts. The main
finding, which can be seen in the full sample as well as in the regionally divided
subsamples, is an increase in the returns to tertiary education over years. Estimates
in column (2) reveal that workers in the West Bank generally earn higher wages
than workers in Gaza. Interestingly, this is not true for the first four years after the
Second Intifada. The income in 2001 is marked by a considerable negative effect
of working in the West Bank compared to working in Gaza. Also Palestinian men
who work in Israel experience a drop in wages in 2001 (see column (3)). However,
the positive mark-up remains and the wage premium in Israel recuperates quickly
to the level before the uprising. With the exception of the year 2001, Palestinian
men who offer their labor in Israel earn between 58 and 92 percent more than their
counterparts in Gaza. At the same time, estimates in column (6) indicate that the
skill premium in Israel is the lowest across the three regions. However, the skill
premium is on average higher in the second half of the observation period. The
highest relative return for tertiary education can be expected by men working in
Gaza, where the increased political tension after September 2000 had little effect on
5A broad body of literature shows that the exogeneity condition does not hold in this wage equation
(see e.g. Card (2001) for an overview). Various instruments are suggested in former research
to mitigate the endogeneity bias, none of which is applicable in this work. Angrist (1995) uses
first-difference estimation to control for unobserved individual effects. However, first-difference
estimation in the presence of little within variation - as is the case in the schooling variable of
interest - yields imprecise estimates. Note that a violation of the exogeneity assumption does not
invalidate the explanatory power of the comparison of schooling estimates over years, which is
the purpose of this section. Rather, the necessary working assumption is that the endogeneity
bias does not change over time. Returns to schooling are likely to be influenced by unobserved
characteristics which influence the accumulation of schooling. The schooling choice, however, is
already taken before the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
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Table 4.4: Dynamics in Returns to Tertiary Education
Full Sample West Bank Gaza Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
skilled West Bank Israel skilled skilled skilled
1996 0.135∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.013
1997 0.134∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.021
1998 0.151∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
1999 0.169∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗
2000 0.163∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
2001 0.168∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.032
2002 0.238∗∗∗ 0.015 0.591∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗
2003 0.248∗∗∗ -0.004 0.637∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.053
2004 0.319∗∗∗ 0.067 0.696∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
2005 0.316∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.073∗
2006 0.316∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗
Note: Controls used are stated in Equation 4.1. Standard errors are clustered at the house-
hold level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
relative wages of skilled workers. Skill premiums presented in column (5) show a
slight drop in 2001 but increase steadily again thereafter. The change in the skill
premium after the Al-Aqsa movement for men working in the West Bank depicted
in column (4), on the other hand, is remarkable.
I find an interesting development of the skill premiums across the three potential
places of work. The question arises why returns to schooling increase to such
an extent after the Second Palestinian Uprising. Since the years of schooling are
increasing over the entire observation period, it is interesting to look at changes in
relative demand for skilled labor. In the following section I therefore use a simple
supply and demand framework to identify the determinants of the relative wage
dynamics presented above.
4.4 Demand and Supply for Skilled Labor
I apply a simple theoretical model which was developed within the literature of
skill-biased technological change and has become a standard model in this strand
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of research.6 The economy produces with two types of labor input, skilled (Ls) and
unskilled (Lu) labor, with corresponding different productivities:
Yt =
[
(αtLs,t)
σ−1
σ + (βtLu,t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(4.2)
where αt and βt are labor-augmenting parameters that are influenced by the
border policy (this includes productivity effects of different capital intensities) and
σ is the substitution elasticity between both types of labor.
Assuming that both types of labor are not perfectly substitutable and considering
furthermore that the labor market is perfectly competitive, one can derive the
relative log wage of skilled labor:7
ln
(
ws,t
wu,t
)
=
σ− 1
σ
ln
(
αt
βt
)
− 1
σ
ln
(
Ls,t
Lu,t
)
(4.3)
where Dt = (σ− 1) ln
(
αt
βt
)
measures log relative demand in favor of skilled labor.
Thus relative demand shifts can be calculated solving the log ratio of competitive
wages for Dt:
Dt = ln
(
ws,tLs,t
ws,tLs,t
)
+ (σ− 1) ln
(
ws,t
wu,t
)
. (4.4)
The log relative demand Dt is hence a function of the log relative wage bill and
log relative supply of skilled labor.
The first term of Equation 4.3 specifies that border policies that result in favoring
skilled labor increase the relative wage of skilled workers if σ > 1.8 The second
term of Equation 4.3 shows that the relationship between log relative supply and
log relative wage of skilled labor is negative. This means that in the absence of
a skill-favoring change the relative wage of skilled labor decreases necessarily if
relative supply increases.9
I calculate the relative wages of skilled compared to low-skilled workers and their
respective relative wage bills as a function of wages and labor supply according to
the above model. Table 4.5 presents all relative measures for the male Palestinian
labor force which are needed to calculate the equilibrium quantities. I find that
Palestinian men who obtained a degree from higher education on average did
6See e.g. Autor et al. (1998) and Card and Lemieux (2001). Bound and Johnson (1992) and Borjas
(2003) also include capital.
7The competitive wages for skilled and unskilled labor are given by:
ws,t = ∂Yt∂Ls,t = α
σ−1
σ
t
[
α
σ−1
σ
t + β
σ−1
σ
t
Ls,t
Lu,t
σ−1
σ
] 1
σ−1
and
wu,t = ∂Yt∂Lu,t = β
σ−1
σ
t
[
β
σ−1
σ
t + α
σ−1
σ
t
Lu,t
Ls,t
σ−1
σ
] 1
σ−1
respectively.
8See that ∂ ln(ws,t/wu,t)
∂ ln(αt/βt)
= σ−1σ .
9See that ∂ ln(ws,t/wu,t)
∂ ln(Ls,t/Lu,t)
= −1σ .
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Table 4.5: Relative Wages, Wage Bill and Supply
Year Relative Wages Relative Wage Bill Relative Supply
1996 0.9561 0.3224 0.3372
1997 0.9327 0.3021 0.3239
1998 0.9205 0.2735 0.2971
1999 0.9380 0.3061 0.3263
2000 0.9327 0.3129 0.3355
2001 1.0202 0.3894 0.3817
2002 1.0971 0.4409 0.4019
2003 1.1099 0.3945 0.3554
2004 1.2047 0.4536 0.3765
2005 1.1704 0.4033 0.3446
2006 1.1962 0.4387 0.3667
Total 1.0435 0.3670 0.3497
not earn more than those without university degree before the Second Palestinian
Uprising, but yield a substantial relative wage increase of about 20 percent within
only 5 years afterwards. The last column shows that the skilled labor share is
considerably larger in the second half of the observation period. This signifies that
the supply side explanation - by which Angrist (1995) explains the decrease in
relative wages of skilled workers in the previous decade with increasing skilled
labor supply - is not transferable to the period under examination in this work.
The strong relative wage gain of skilled workers together with their rising labor
supply explains the very large increase of 50 percent in the wage bill over the whole
observation period.
I use the simple supply and demand framework introduced above to derive
changes in relative demand for skilled labor according to Equation 5.2. Table
4.6 presents average annual log changes in relative wages, relative wage bill share,
relative supply and relative demand of skilled labor. To calculate the latter, I assume
different degrees of substitutability between both types of labor.10 Table 4.6 reports
the mean annual log changes for the five-year periods before and after the Second
10I expect σ ∈ [1, 2]. Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the rate of substitution of both types of labor
for the U.S. labor market 1963 - 1987 and yield a estimate of σ = 1.41 This is very similar to results
of Card and Lemieux (2001) who estimate a range of substitution elasticities between 1.1 and 1.6
differentiating by gender. To the best of my knowledge no such estimates are available for the
Palestinian labor market in the literature yet.
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Table 4.6: Average Annual Log Changes
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Wage Wage Bill Supply Demand Demand Demand
σ = 1 σ = 1.5 σ = 2
Before 1.2977 3.7766 2.4789 3.7766 4.4254 5.0742
After 3.1826 2.3815 -0.8012 2.3815 3.9728 5.5641
Total 2.2402 3.0790 0.8389 3.0790 4.1991 5.3192
Intifada.11 I find increasing relative wages for skilled labor in both periods. Note,
however, that the average annual growth of relative wages is accelerated in the
second period.12 A strong relative demand growth dominates the relative supply
growth in the first period. After the Second Intifada the supply of skilled relative to
low-skilled workers declines in the Palestinian labor market. The Palestinian labor
market narrows down after 2000 as a result of stricter border policies. This results
in a squeezing in of low-skilled workers into the local labor market by which the
relative supply of skilled workers decreases. The relative demand keeps growing,
but at a lower pace than in the first period. The reduced relative supply is what
drives up relative wages of skilled workers. In the following section I will use a
regional decomposition to illustrate relative employment changes across regions.
Furthermore, I will examine through which mechanisms skilled workers profit
from the tightening of the labor market.
4.5 A Regional Decomposition
A simple but efficient explorative tool to analyze the change in the allocation of labor
across groups will be applied in the following. The aim is to understand the gain in
the relative wage of skilled workers related to the relocation of labor across different
demographic groups. Therefore, employment shifts will be decomposed into two
components. The change of the share of skilled labor in aggregate employment
can be described by a shift across regions (where regions differ in skilled labor
intensities) and a change of the occupational structures within k regions as follows:
11Note that I measure the first change from the first year to the next just in 1997 and likewise the
effect of the Uprising just in 2001. Table 4.12 in the Appendix displays in Panel A the annual log
relative wages, log relative supply and derived log relative demand. Panel B presents how these
translate into annual log changes which are finally used to calculate the averages in Table 4.6.
12This is in line with findings in column (1) of Table 4.4.
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where N is the total employment, Ns is the total employment of the skilled la-
bor and Nsk and Nk the respective employments in region k. Two points in time
determine the end and the beginning of a period, t and t− τ. The first term of
the right hand side measures the employment shift between k regions by sum-
ming up over all regions the change in employment in region k relative to overall
employment weighted by the average skilled labor employed in region k. The
second term describes a within-region shift as the sum of the rates of change of
the skilled labor ratio used in region k weighted with the share of employment
in region k in overall employment. Later on in this section I will furthermore
analyze changes in the relative wage bill share of skilled workers. Analyzing those
together with the change in employment share permits conclusions on whether
employment shifts or wage changes or both determine a change in the earned
income (as a product of work and wage) of skilled workers. Section 4.6 will extend
on this analysis in the sense that it incorporates changes in the sectoral composition.
Table 4.7 shows the decomposition of changes in the skilled labor employment
share into relative employment shifts between regions and changes of the relative
employment within regions. These shifts are illustrated for the period before the
Second Palestinian Uprising in the upper part of the Table and for the period after
the crisis in the lower part of the Table. In the first column we notice a relative
employment shift across regions from the West Bank to Israel and Gaza before the
Second Intifada. The second column shows that employment in the West Bank is
3.5 times more skill-intensive than Palestinian labor used in Israel. This results in a
strong decrease in the share of skilled labor in aggregate employment. The positive
employment shift to Gaza, the most skill-intensive region, is too small to make up
for the loss in skilled labor use. The employment shift between regions sums up
to a negative effect. At the same time, the employment share of skilled workers
employed per region increases in both Palestinian Territories. Since the share of
workers who are employed in these regions outweighs by far the relative employ-
ment in Israel, this positive employment shift in favor of skilled labor dominates
the skilled labor loss in Israel. This leads to an average increase in skilled labor
use within regions. Summing up the between and within shift, the total effect is
positive, meaning that overall there is a skill-favoring employment shift in the first
observation period.
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Table 4.7: Regional Decomposition of Employment
employment share of employment share of
change skilled change workers
in region k workers of skilled employed
to total employed workers in
employment in region k in region k region k
1996-2000
West Bank -0.0476 0.2817 0.0094 0.5458
Gaza 0.0140 0.3134 0.0365 0.2408
Israel 0.0336 0.0871 -0.0050 0.2134
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
0.6754 -0.6097 1.2851
2001-2006
West Bank 0.0346 0.2708 -0.0305 0.5941
Gaza 0.0058 0.3561 -0.0058 0.2876
Israel -0.0404 0.0813 0.0315 0.1183
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
-0.7933 0.8154 -1.6087
With the outbreak of the Second Intifada the relative regional employment shifts
back from Israel to the Palestinian Territories, mainly to the West Bank (see first
column). Since Israel is the least skill-intensive region (see second column), this
shift creates an increase in skilled labor share. At the same time, however, the share
of skilled workers employed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip declines (see third
column). Since those two regions are the ones using the highest shares of aggregate
employment, the increase in skilled labor share in Israel cannot compensate for
the shift to low-skilled labor within the Palestinian Territories. The within-region
change of relative skilled labor is strongly negative and larger than the positive
shift between regions. The overall effect is therefore negative which implies that the
relative share of skilled workers employed after the Second Palestinian Uprising
declines.
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Table 4.8: Regional Decomposition of Wage Bill
change in skilled change in wage
wage bill wage wage bill bill
share in bill share share of share
region k to wage skilled of
to total bill in workers in workers in
wage bill region k region k region k
1996-2000
West Bank -0.0302 0.2950 0.0114 0.4771
Gaza 0.0016 0.3810 0.0380 0.1765
Israel 0.0419 0.0901 -0.0012 0.2927
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
0.7259 -0.4516 1.1776
2001-2006
West Bank 0.0058 0.3022 0.0024 0.5672
Gaza 0.0213 0.4232 0.0135 0.2474
Israel -0.0441 0.0861 0.0376 0.1685
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
1.7998 0.6969 1.1029
Table 4.8 illustrates the results of the decomposition analysis with regard to the
wage bill share of skilled workers. The upper part of the Table parallels the results
of the employment shifts before the Second Intifada in Table 4.7. A regional shift
of income generated in the West Bank to Israel (see first column) coupled with
a higher relative wage bill share of skilled workers in the Palestinian Territories
(see second column) leads to a decrease in the skilled workers wage bill share
due to a cross-regional shift.13 The third column shows that the relative wage bill
13Note that we can recognize the wage dynamics across regions comparing the first columns of
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. For example the wage bill share loss in the West Bank is smaller than the
decrease in employment share. This indicates that the wage in the West Bank in the first period
was increasing. Similarly, we can identify an increasing wage in Israel and a decreasing wage in
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share of skilled workers increases in the Palestinian Territories. From Table 4.7 we
remember that this increase is supported by a higher employment share of skilled
workers in this region. However, comparing the change in the wage bill share to
the change in employment also reveals that the skill premium has risen in all three
regions. This is reassuring the findings displayed in columns (4) to (6) of Table
4.4. This positive change in the skilled workers’ wage bill share within regions
dominates the negative between-region shift. The overall change of the relative
wage bill is therefore positive. Comparing the size of the overall wage bill shift
in favor of skilled labor with the one of the employment shift, we observe that
the relative wage increased in the first period. This is consistent with the model
calculation of Table 4.6.
After the Second Intifada, the wage bill share of skilled workers in Israel declines
while the ones in the Palestinian Territories, especially in the Gaza Strip, increase.
This, again, parallels findings on changes of the regional employment share dis-
played in Table 4.7.14 The between-region shift of the relative wage bill is therefore
positive. Contrary to the patterns found in the employment share analysis, the
changes in the wage bill share of skilled workers within the regions are all positive.
This is a consequence of the high increase of the relative wage for skilled labor,
in particular in Gaza and the West Bank (see also Table 4.4).15 It follows that the
within-region shift of the relative wage bill share is strong and positive. Summing
up the two positive shifts, the overall change in the relative wage bill therefore
favors skilled labor also in the second period.16
To summarize the findings presented in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8: the relative
increase in income generated by skilled labor after the year 2000 is a results of two
channels. First, a shift of employment to regions that are skill-intensive (Gaza and
West Bank). Second, an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers in all three
regions. The latter in turn, can eventually result from a change in the allocation of
aggregate labor across sectors. The next section therefore provides an examination
of changes in the sectoral composition.
Gaza. See also Table 4.11 in the Appendix.
14Conclusions about the change in relative wages can again be drawn on the basis of a comparison
of the magnitude of the shifts between Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. The relative wage increases in
Gaza and decreases in the West Bank and Israel. See also Table 4.11.
15If the change in the employment share is negative, the change in the wage bill share can still be
positive if the increase in the relative wage is high enough.
16Comparing the total shift of the wage bill share to the total shift of the employment share leads to
the conclusion that the relative wage increased strongly in the period after the Second Intifada
(see also Table 4.6).
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4.6 A Sectoral Decomposition
I am modifying Equation 4.5 such that k regions are substituted by j sectors. Table
4.9 presents shifts in skilled labor intensity decomposed into shifts between and
within sectors. The cell labeled total presents the annual growth rate of the skilled
labor share, the cells labeled between and within display changes of the allocation
of aggregate labor between sectors and changes in the skilled labor share within
sectors, respectively. Changes in aggregate employment before the Second Intifada
occured in favor of the agriculture, the construction and the service sectors. Out
of these, the latter is particularly skill-intensive such that the between-sector shift
in employment sums up to 6.44 percent annual growth in relative employment.
The skilled-labor share within sectors in this period of time, on the other hand,
decreases slightly as a result of the skill reduction in agriculture and service. How-
ever, the between-shift dominates the within-shift such that the average annual
growth in the skilled labor share amounts to 0.66 percent. After the Second Intifada
the agricultural sector experiences an employment growth while the aggregate
employment in the construction sector is reduced. The between-shift in relative
labor employment is small but positive. At the same time, the service, commerce
and manufacturing sectors reduce their skill intensities which leads to a decrease
in relative employment. Skill intensities increase in agriculture and transport, how-
ever, these two sectors are smaller and cannot compensate for the loss in relative
factor demand in service, commerce and manufacturing. This creates a significant
within-shift in favor of low-skilled labor which dominates the positive skill-favoring
between-shift by far. The total share of relative employment decreases by 0.79
percent annually.
Table 4.10 parallels the findings for the first period of Table 4.9. More interesting
dynamics are observed in the second period. The wage bill share produced in the
agricultural sector decreases even though Table 4.9 shows an increase in employ-
ment. This suggests that workers moved from the agricultural sector in Israel to
the local one where they earn lower wages. The wage bill share generated in the
construction sector decreases heavily. This is partly explained by decreased employ-
ment. The rest of the decrease is explained by lower wages which suggest the same
phenomenon as described for the agricultural sector. Note that the manufacturing
and commercial sectros also face a decreasing wage bill share. However, those two
sectors experienced higher losses in the previous period. The service sector - as
a consequence of decreasing wage and employment shares in the other sectors -
gains relative importance in the generation of income. Since the service sector is
the most skill-intensive one, this creates a huge relative gain for skilled workers.
This is so even though the skill intensity in the service sector decreases in this
period, which - together with an additional skill reduction in the commercial sector
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Table 4.9: Sectoral Decomposition of Employment
employment share of employment share of
change skilled change workers
in sector j workers of skilled employed
to total employed workers in
employment in sector j sector j sector j
1996-2000
agriculture 0.0128 0.0755 -0.0241 0.1010
commerce -0.0343 0.1855 0.0072 0.1823
construction 0.0223 0.0919 0.0063 0.2175
manufacturing -0.0259 0.1177 0.0291 0.1338
service 0.0244 0.5524 -0.0188 0.2984
transport 0.0008 0.0943 0.0135 0.0670
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
0.6558 0.7124 -0.0567
2001-2006
agriculture 0.0198 0.0769 0.0289 0.1139
commerce 0.0008 0.1957 -0.0120 0.1866
construction -0.0231 0.0834 0.0001 0.1485
manufacturing -0.0040 0.1106 -0.0093 0.1167
service 0.0003 0.5371 -0.0258 0.3589
transport 0.0061 0.1168 0.0149 0.0755
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
-0.7937 0.0212 -0.8149
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Table 4.10: Sectoral Decomposition of Wage Bill
change in skilled change in wage
wage bill wage wage bill bill
share in bill share share of share
sector j to wage skilled of
to total bill in workers in workers in
wage bill sector j sector j sector j
1996-2000
agriculture 0.0118 0.0789 -0.0177 0.0871
commerce -0.0308 0.1703 0.0046 0.1892
construction 0.0337 0.0950 0.0086 0.2824
manufacturing -0.0179 0.1165 0.0308 0.1322
service 0.0105 0.6073 -0.0120 0.2476
transport -0.0009 0.0995 0.0240 0.0596
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
0.7369 0.3077 0.4292
2001-2006
agriculture -0.0085 0.0811 0.0283 0.0823
commerce -0.0154 0.1959 -0.0260 0.1849
construction -0.0505 0.0840 0.0109 0.1860
manufacturing -0.0097 0.1237 0.0010 0.1221
service 0.0330 0.5979 -0.0118 0.3421
transport 0.0031 0.1350 0.0336 0.0656
TOTAL BETWEEN WITHIN
0.8809 1.0994 -0.2186
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- creates a negative within-shift. However, the cross-sectoral shift which gives more
importance to the service sector, whose skill intensity is 60 percent, is influential
enough to create a substantial positive skill bias of 0.88 percent of annual growth
in relative income.
The findings of the previous two Tables can be summarized as follows. After
the Second Intifada aggregate employment shifts from the construction sector to
agriculture which creates a loss in relative employment of skilled workers. However,
the wage bill shares in all sectors but the service sector decrease as a consequence of
the regional employment shift outlined in the previous section. The skill-intensive
service sector, contrary to the other sectors, is less mobile and therefore does
not suffer a wage decrease induced by a return to the local market. Thus, the
increase in the relative wage of skilled workers is a consequence of a shift of relative
employment to the service sector.17
4.7 Conclusions
As pointed out by Angrist (1995), the returns to schooling decreased in the 1980s
as a response to an increased higher educational attainment. This work shows
that the falling trend in relative wages of skilled workers does not continue in
later years even though the educational expansion continues. Especially after the
Second Intifada the skill premium rises remarkably. Political disturbances in the
region starting in September 2000 lead to stricter border policies which reduce
labor mobility. Mainly low-skilled Palestinian workers are pushed back to the local
labor market where they experience a substantial wage decline. The supply of high-
relative to low-skilled workers decreases in the Palestinian labor market as a result
of the squeezing in of low-skilled workers into the local labor market. The relative
demand keeps growing, but at a lower pace than in the first period. It is thus the
decreased relative supply which drives up relative wages of skilled workers.
A variance decomposition reveals the mechanism behind the relative gain of
skilled workers. The relative increase in income generated by skilled labor after
the year 2000 is a result of two channels. First, a shift of employment to the West
Bank and Gaza which use more skill-intensive Palestinian labor than Israel. Second,
an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers in all three regions. The latter
effect is explained by a skill-biased labor shift which occurs through a change in
the sectoral composition. More precisely, the gain in the relative wage of skilled
workers can be explained by a change in employment across sectors in favor of
the local service sector which yields the highest skill intensity. The skill-intensive
17This does not imply that service workers do not experience a decline in their wage level after the
year 2000. The increase in relative wages of skilled workers mainly is explained by the wage loss
of the mobile workers (which are mainly low-skilled).
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service sector, contrary to the other sectors, is less mobile and therefore does not
suffer a wage decrease induced by a return to the local market. As a matter of fact,
the relative wage increase of skilled workers is not a result of increasing wages for
their labor, but arises due to the fact that their wage losses are smaller than those
of low-skilled workers. In revealing the compositional mechanism working behind
the change in relative wages, these results complement findings of Etkes (2012)
who finds that an increase in work permits issued to Palestinian workers in times
of conflict relaxation benefits the low-skilled Palestinian workers and adversely
affects returns to schooling in the Palestinian Territories.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.11: Mean Wage over Time by Place of Work
Year West Bank Gaza Israel
1996 57.46 52.68 89.85
1997 57.54 50.04 92.03
1998 57.79 49.83 93.19
1999 60.22 49.76 93.31
2000 61.48 49.71 94.79
2001 55.99 47.61 78.76
2002 57.43 46.79 88.87
2003 54.25 43.94 87.03
2004 54.47 47.41 87.38
2005 52.74 47.35 86.18
2006 53.77 51.24 86.11
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Table 4.12: Log Measures and Annual Changes in Log Measures
PANEL A: LOG MEASURES OVER YEARS
log relative log relative log relative log relative log relative log relative
wage wage bill supply demand demand demand
Year (σ = 1) (σ = 1.5) (σ = 2)
1996 -0.0449 -1.1319 -1.0870 -1.1319 -1.1544 -1.1768
1997 -0.0697 -1.1970 -1.1273 -1.1970 -1.2318 -1.2667
1998 -0.0828 -1.2965 -1.2136 -1.2965 -1.3379 -1.3793
1999 -0.0640 -1.1838 -1.1198 -1.1838 -1.2158 -1.2478
2000 -0.0696 -1.1617 -1.0921 -1.1617 -1.1966 -1.2314
2001 0.0200 -0.9431 -0.9631 -0.9431 -0.9331 -0.9231
2002 0.0927 -0.8189 -0.9116 -0.8189 -0.7725 -0.7262
2003 0.1043 -0.9302 -1.0345 -0.9302 -0.8780 -0.8259
2004 0.1862 -0.7906 -0.9768 -0.7906 -0.6975 -0.6044
2005 0.1573 -0.9081 -1.0655 -0.9081 -0.8295 -0.7508
2006 0.1791 -0.8240 -1.0032 -0.8240 -0.7345 -0.6449
Total 0.0371 -1.0169 -1.0540 -1.0169 -0.9983 -0.9797
PANEL B: ANNUAL CHANGES IN LOG MEASURES (x 100)
change in change in change in change in change in change in
log relative log relative log relative log relative log relative log relative
wage wage bill supply demand demand demand
Year (σ = 1) (σ = 1.5) (σ = 2)
1996 . . . . . .
1997 -2.4806 -6.5049 -4.0242 -6.5049 -7.7452 -8.9855
1998 -1.3157 -9.9521 -8.6364 -9.9521 -10.6099 -11.2677
1999 1.8812 11.2673 9.3861 11.2673 12.2079 13.1485
2000 -0.5594 2.2079 2.7673 2.2079 1.9282 1.6485
2001 8.9628 21.8646 12.9018 21.8646 26.3460 30.8274
2002 7.2703 12.4228 5.1525 12.4228 16.0580 19.6931
2003 1.1580 -11.1304 -12.2885 -11.1304 -10.5514 -9.9724
2004 8.1912 13.9551 5.7640 13.9551 18.0507 22.1463
2005 -2.8865 -11.7509 -8.8644 -11.7509 -13.1941 -14.6374
2006 2.1801 8.4107 6.2306 8.4107 9.5008 10.5908
Total 2.2402 3.0790 0.8389 3.0790 4.1991 5.3192
5 Gender Wage Gap and the Second
Palestinian Uprising
5.1 Introduction
Inequality in wages between men and women is a high-ranked policy issue in
nearly every country in the world. Policy makers are often referred to aggregate
statistics that provide a clear and easy message: women earn less than men and
women are underrepresented in high-skilled and well-paid jobs. A common pol-
icy measure derived from those statistics often tries to enforce a higher share of
women into high job positions by legal directive. Controlling for educational and
other socio-economic gender differences - which strongly differ across countries -
earlier literature found a substantial male-female earnings gap which could not
be explained and was hence attributed to labor market discrimination (see e.g.
O’Neill, 1985; Blau and Ferber, 1987; O’Neill and Polachek, 1993).1 More recent
literature finds that these unexplained wage differentials are mainly driven by
omitted variables and can be explained by differences in workplace and job char-
acteristics (O’Neill, 2003), unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity (Kim and
Polachek, 1994). As a matter of fact, the gender wage gap has seen various changes
throughout recent decades that differ across countries. While developed countries
experienced no change (see e.g. Mussida and Picchio, 2013 on Italy) or a decrease
in the gender pay gap (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1997, and Bacolod and Blum, 2010,
for studies on the U.S.; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010, for an analysis on West Ger-
many) the trend in developing countries is less explicit. Cross-country comparison
reveals that whether the gender gap has closed or widened depends largely on the
structural changes on the production side which in turn determine relative demand
for female labor. Rendall (2013) finds that wage disparities between men and
women are successfully reduced in countries which shift from “brawn”-intensive
to “brain”-intensive production. Research aiming at identifying driving factors
behind the catch-up of women’s wages in developed economies finds that tech-
nological change favored female employment and wages (see e.g. Blau and Kahn,
1997; Bacolod and Blum, 2010; Yamaguchi, 2013; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010).
1Stanley and Jarrell (1998) published a meta-study on the discrimination gender gap. Evaluating 55
studies they calculate a mean gender gap of 31.8 percent. The range of the gender gap estimates
produced by those selected studies is, however, considerable with a minimum estimate of 2.7 and
a maximum estimate of 91 percent.
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The bottom line of this research can be summarized as follows: Changes in the
occupational mix or in job tasks happened in favor of non-routine and analyti-
cal skills in which men - other than in motor skills - have no comparative advantage.
To the best of my knowledge only two studies examine the gender pay gap in
the Palestinian Territories. Daoud (2005) estimates the differences in returns to
schooling between men and women. He finds that women earn 14 to 15 percent
less in 1999. Between the years 1999 and 2001 - one year before and one year after
the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising - the estimated wage differential
declines which the author explains with a rise in male unemployment during the
Second Intifada. This result does not come unexpected. It is widely known that
mainly male Palestinian workers take the effort of commuting and profit from
higher earnings across the border in times of relaxed access policies. Daoud and
Shanti (2012) analyze differences in private-public sector employment and wage
differentials in the Palestinian Territories from a gender perspective. They find
that women’s wages are higher in the public sector only. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, they can attribute this fact to differences in endowment, i.e. women
having higher schooling than men in this sector. These earlier contributions were
critized in detail in Section 2.3. There were three major points of critique: First, the
link between gender wage gap and the role of sector employment remains largely
unexplored. Second, with the applied estimation strategy the authors cannot
explain changes in the wage gap over time. Third, differences in endowment
seem to be largely uncontrolled, therefore falsely ascribing differences in wages to
differences in returns.
The present paper takes this earlier work as a starting point and aims at making
several contributions. First, it provides empirical evidence about the evolution of
the gender wage gap in the Palestinian Territories between 1996 and 2006. Second,
it quantifies how much of the change in the wage differential between men and
women can be attributed to changes in the composition of employed labor relative
to changes in rewards to workers’ attributes. Third, it uncovers to which extent the
gender-equalizing effect is driven by sector-workplace shifts that can be related
to the Second Intifada and the Israeli border policies. And fourth, it identifies the
sectors which secure the Palestinian workforce and also those which favor relative
demand for female labor. With the identification of those sectors this work offers
a key to develop policy measures which stabilize the Palestinian economy which
has been shown to be extremely vulnerable to political distress in the past. It
also pinpoints factors which favor womens’ employment and should therefore be
considered by any policy maker who wishes to enhance gender equality.
Contrary to results derived in studies on developed economies, I find that the
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wage differential between male and female workers in Gaza and the West Bank
increased till 1999. Interestingly, this trend is only reversed with the outbreak of
the Second Palestinian Uprising in September 2000 and rapidly approaches zero
at the end of the observation period. The change in the wage differential in favor
of women in the second half of the observation period can be explained by both a
change in relative prices of observed characteristics of male and female workers but
also by a change in the workers’ composition. The larger effect, however, can be
attributed to compositional changes which come along with enforced Israeli border
measures. Those reduce the share of Palestinian labor employed in Israel and at the
same time change the industry mix of Palestinian labor. Both compositional effects
work in favor of female employment. In periods of low conflict and relaxed border
policies mainly male Palestinian workers take advantage of higher wages in Israel.
Employment opportunities for Palestinian workers in Israel are predominantly
offered in occupations which comprise physical strength - an occupational field
in which male labor is favored over female. An analysis of the sector-workplace
composition reveals that with the outbreak of the Second Intifada employment
in the local labor market gains relative importance. Sectors that withstand the
political distress are the service and agricultural sectors located in Gaza and West
Bank whereas the construction sector located in Israel loses employment. These
changes in the sectoral composition come in favor of female employment. The
local agriculture and service sectors are the ones with the highest share of female
employment. The labor demand for women increases by an estimated total of 19
percent while the demand for male labor decreases by 4.5 percent. The womens’
gain in relative demand thus explains a substantial part of the observed narrowing
wage differences between men and women.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 shortly presents
the data used in this work and provides some useful descriptives on labor-market
relevant gender differences in the Palestinian Territories. Section 5.3 examines
occupational differences between male and female workers before and during the
Second Palestinian Uprising. Section 5.4 calculates the contributions of possible
factors in reducing the gender gap. Section 5.5 details the role which specific
sector-workplace shifts play in explaining the reduction of the gender wage gap.
Section 5.6 concludes this work.
5.2 Gender Differences in Palestinian Territories
The data used in this analysis stem from the Labor Force Surveys provided by
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. The survey design follows recom-
mendations of the International Labor Organization and is intended to provide a
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Figure 5.1: Gender Wage Gap, 1996−2006
Note: The gender wage gap is represented from the 2nd quarter of 1996 to the 4th quarter in 2006 in
a 9-quarter moving average of the median real daily wage of women over that of men.
representative sample on the district level. Individuals are drawn on a quarterly
base in repeated rounds from a two-stage stratified cluster random sample. The
accrued rotated panel covers 1/6 of the total sample in each round in all sample
areas. I restrict the sample to full-time working men and women aged between 26
and 65. Over the entire period from 1996 to 2006 this yields 164,290 labor market
observations for men and 39,498 for women living in 112,381 households. The wage
variable used is the real daily wage expressed in 1996 NIS (New Israeli Shekel).
Figure 5.1 shows the gender wage trend in the Palestinian Territories after 1996.
The wage differential in this graph is represented by the 9-quarter moving average
of the median real daily wage of women over that of men. The unadjusted wage
gap between male and female workers increased till 1999 and decreased sharply
after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The catch-up of female wages to the male
wage level after the year 2000 is especially strong till the year 2003. Within only
7 years the ratio of female over male wages increases from 72 percent in 1999 to
95 percent in 2006. Changes in the gender wage gap can occur due to changes in
womens’ characteristics relative to men’s or due to changes in their relative returns.
Table 5.1 therefore presents changes in potential wage determinants for the pe-
riod of interest for women and men. The first row depicts the log real daily wage by
gender pooled for years before and during the Second Intifada. The observed real
wages are always higher for men. However, the wage differential between sexes
amounts to an average of 26 percent in the period before the Second Intifada and
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Table 5.1: Gender Differences in Socio-Economic Characteristics
1996-1999 2001-2005
male female ∆1 male female ∆2
∣∣∆2∣∣− ∣∣∆1∣∣
log wage 4.1290 3.8693 0.2597 3.9429 3.8300 0.1129 -0.1468
university 0.2417 0.3724 -0.1307 0.2799 0.3940 -0.1141 -0.0166
years school 10.0365 9.2402 0.7963 10.6819 9.9800 0.7019 -0.0944
experience 21.9358 23.4973 -1.5615 22.4071 23.1702 -0.7631 -0.7984
urban 0.4411 0.3980 0.0431 0.4664 0.4088 0.0576 0.0145
rural 0.4030 0.4861 -0.0831 0.3428 0.4470 -0.1042 0.0211
camp 0.1560 0.1159 0.0401 0.1908 0.1442 0.0466 0.0065
Gaza 0.3057 0.1821 0.1236 0.3356 0.2264 0.1092 -0.0144
West Bank 0.6943 0.8179 -0.1236 0.6644 0.7736 -0.1092 -0.0144
work Israel 0.2245 0.0234 0.2011 0.1049 0.0124 0.0925 -0.1086
Note: ∆1 is calculated as mean value of males minus mean value of females for observations
pooled for the period before the Second Intifada. ∆2 is calculated respectively for the period
during the Second Intifada.
narrows down to 11.3 percent for observations pooled over years during the Second
Intifada. The educational background of labor market participants is controlled
for by two variables. One measures the years of schooling, of which men are
accumulating 0.8 more in the first period or 0.7 more in the second period. Interest-
ingly, measuring schooling success by a tertiary degree indicates that the schooling
distribution of females is very different to that of males. There are as much as
13.1 percent more female wage earners holding a university degree as their male
counterparts before the year 2000. Even though this difference is reduced slightly
for the years after the Al-Aqsa movement it still points to a distinct selection into
labor market activity for women compared to men. Women which have enjoyed
higher education seem to face higher costs in staying out of the labor market. It is
therefore important to control for the educational background of wage earners in
both dimensions, years of schooling and university degree, as their schooling dis-
tribution differs considerably. Women in this sample seem to be more experienced
than men.2 What is important to notice is that differences in wages, education and
experience between sexes are smaller in absolute terms after the outbreak of the Sec-
ond Intifada. This is not the case for the regional provenance of the worker. While
women are most likely to work in rural areas, men are most likely to work in urban
areas. This difference increases after the year 2000. The gender differences in labor
market activity between Gaza and West Bank is smaller in the second period. While
2However, due to a lack of information on actual job experience and job interruptions, I calculated
potential experience as standardized by the literature (age minus schooling years minus 6). This
might lead to an overestimation of the actual job experience of women compared to that of men.
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30.6 percent of the male wage earners observed between 1996 and 1999 are Gazian,
only 18.2 percent of the working women are from Gaza. For the second period the
share of Gazians with observed wage increases for both sexes, but Gazian women
gain relative importance. The biggest convergence in wage related labor market
characteristics, however, can be found in the last row of Table 5.1. While before the
Second Palestinian Uprising 22.5 percent of the Palestinian men work in Israel, only
2.3 percent of the Palestinian women commute to a workplace across the border.
This huge difference decreases in the second half of the observation period due
to a decline in labor market mobility of Palestinian men. After the year 2000 only
10.5 percent of the Palestinian male workers report to work in Israel. To sum up
findings so far: If one can expect wages to vary along the socio-economic character-
istics as stated in Table 5.1, then a reduction in differences along those observable
characteristics may explain a decrease in the gender wage gap as depicted in Figure
5.1. The only labor-market relevant characteristic in which gender differences
are not reduced is the type of locality the workers live in. The extent to which
this increase in gender differences may contribute to a widening of wage differen-
tials between men and women is determined by the difference in renumeration for
work across these locality types. This analysis will follow in Section 5.4 of this work.
5.3 Occupational Differences
O’Neill (2003) emphasizes that the gender wage gap disappears when occupational
differences between men and women are controlled for. Might the convergence in
occupational choices between men and women therefore explain the narrowing
male-female wage differential? Table 5.2 displays important differences in occu-
pational choices between women and men before and after the outbreak of the
Second Palestinian Uprising. Differences in occupational choices are represented
across six different sectors and seven occupational groups. While most women
work in the service sector or agriculture (78.9 percent before and 84.6 percent after
the outbreak of the Second Intifada), the sector choice of male workers is more
diversified. Palestinian men predominantly work in service industries, construction
or commerce. However, there is a strong shift in relative employment between
sectors. While the share of male workers employed in services gains relative im-
portance, the construction sector loses relative employment. This is likely to be
related to restricted labor mobility that comes along with enforced border controls.
The connection of the political situation and sector-workplace shifts will be further
examined in Section 5.5. For now it is important to notice that gender inequality in
sectoral distributions increases from the first to the second period in all sectors with
the exception of the construction and the service sectors. If wages paid to workers
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Table 5.2: Sectoral and Occupational Changes
1996-1999 2001-2005
male female ∆1 male female ∆2
∣∣∆2∣∣− ∣∣∆1∣∣
Sectors
agriculture 0.0883 0.3315 -0.2432 0.1122 0.3764 -0.2642 0.0210
manufacture 0.1406 0.1229 0.0177 0.1142 0.0739 0.0403 0.0226
construction 0.2254 0.0036 0.2218 0.1360 0.0017 0.1343 -0.0875
commerce 0.1842 0.0800 0.1042 0.1881 0.0755 0.1126 0.0084
transport 0.0638 0.0042 0.0596 0.0730 0.0035 0.0695 0.0099
service 0.2978 0.4578 -0.1600 0.3765 0.4691 -0.0926 -0.0674
Occupations
managers 0.0563 0.0308 0.0255 0.0525 0.0269 0.0256 0.0001
technical 0.1943 0.3885 -0.1942 0.2382 0.4014 -0.1632 -0.0310
service 0.0585 0.0308 0.0277 0.1874 0.0870 0.1004 0.0727
skilled agric 0.0641 0.3183 -0.2542 0.0853 0.3676 -0.2823 0.0281
craft workers 0.2422 0.1100 0.1322 0.1817 0.0469 0.1348 0.0026
machine oper 0.0964 0.0050 0.0914 0.1074 0.0196 0.0878 -0.0036
elementary 0.2883 0.1166 0.1717 0.1475 0.0506 0.0969 -0.0748
Note: ∆1 is calculated as mean value of males minus mean value of females for observations
pooled for the period before the Second Intifada. ∆2 is calculated respectively for the period
during the Second Intifada.
differ across sectors then a decrease in the gender wage gap is only consistent with
the herewith stated gender-specific sectoral shifts if the convergence in construction
and service sectors sets off the divergence in employment in all the other sectors.
The last column of Table 5.2 indicates the direction and the magnitude of the shift.
A negative sign indicates a decrease in gender differences in labor allocation to
the distinct sectors, a positive sign an increase. Note that the decrease in gender
inequality across sectors is larger in agriculture and construction than the increase
in inequalities in the other sectors. However, how much this contributes to the
narrowing gender wage gap will be determined not only by the shifts depicted
above, but also by the difference in returns to employment in the respective sectors.
A similar analysis can be carried out along professional groups. Women work
predominantly in skilled agriculture and professional and technical occupations.
Men’s occupational choices are less concentrated. Before the Second Intifada the
highest share of male workers is found in elementary occupations, followed by
craft work and professional and technical occupations. Interesting shifts occur out
of the elementary occupations after the year 2000 - a phenomenon likely to be
linked to the restricted border mobility. Occupations in commerce and services as
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well as technical and professional jobs gain relative importance. Which one of the
occuring shifts is gender-equalizing in terms of relative employment can be read
off in the last column. A minus sign indicates that occupational disparities between
male and female workers are reduced. The decrease in male labor employed
in elementary occupations exerts the strongest effect in reducing occupational
disparities between sexes. The pull-out of male labor from elementary occupations
comes along with a relative increase in male labor in commerce and service as
well as in professional and technical occupations, the former increasing, the latter
decreasing the dissimilarity of the occupational profiles of men and women.
5.4 Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap
The extent to which the convergence of wage determining characteristics between
men and women (see Section 5.2) and male-female relative employment changes
across sectors and occupations (see Section 5.3) translates into relative wage changes
between men and women depends not only on how much more similar workers
of both sexes become over time, but also on how much more equally they get
paid (along equal characteristics). The return to individual characteristics and job
characteristics has been neglected so far and shall now be included into the analysis.
The interest of this work lies in identifying factors which explain changes in
the gender wage gap over time. I adopt an analytical framework developed by
Juhn et al. (1993) which allows us to decompose the changes in wage differentials
between male and female workers into endowment-related relative wage changes
and relative changes in returns. This decomposition method, in a first step, assesses
the determinants of wage differentials between men and women for each point in
time. In a second step, the difference of these differentials between points in time
informs us about changes in endowment and prices of observable and unobservable
characteristics which, in turn, explain changes in the gender wage gap. This double
decomposition can be written as follows:
GT2 − GT1 = (∆XT2 − ∆XT1)βT1 + ∆XT2(βT2 − βT1) (5.1)
+ (∆θT2 − ∆θT1)σT1 + ∆θT2(σT2 − σT1)
where Gt is the male-female log wage gap in time point t and t = [T1, T2]. T1
and T2 measure observations in the periods of 1996 to 1999 and 2001 to 2006,
respectively. ∆Xt represents differences in observable characteristics between men
and women in time t. βt is a vector of parameter estimates in the male wage
equation. θt is the standardized residual and σt is the standard deviation of the
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Table 5.3: Decomposition of Changes in the Gender Wage Gap
Model I Model II
∆ wage gap -0.1469 -0.1469
Observed characteristics: -0.0054 -0.1007
experience 0.0032 0.0031
schooling 0.0020 0.0124
region -0.0106 -0.0026
work in Israel - -0.0849
occupation - 0.0103
sector - -0.0390
Observed prices: -0.1140 -0.0644
experience -0.0071 -0.0048
schooling -0.0808 -0.0102
region -0.0262 -0.0098
work in Israel - 0.0098
occupation - -0.0156
sector - -0.0338
Unobserved characteristics: -0.0133 0.0145
Unobserved prices: -0.0143 0.0037
Note: Experience includes potential experience and its square.
Schooling is measured by years of schooling and tertiary degree.
Region includes controls for living in urban, rural areas or in the
Gaza Strip. Parameter estimates are derived using the male wage
equation. The benchmark period is T1 (1996-1999).
residuals in the male wage equation.3 The first term on the right hand side of the
Equation 5.1 therefore describes the endowment effect in observed characteristics,
the second term the price effect in observed characteristics, the third term the gap
effect, i.e. endowment effect in unmeasured gender differences, and the fourth
term the price effect of the unobservables.
Table 5.3 displays results of the double decomposition of the male-female log
wage gap using Equation 5.1. Pooling the years 1996 to 1999 as period T1 and the
years 2001 to 2006 as period T2 the observed gender log wage gap decreased by
3The parameter estimates are preferably derived from the male wage equation in the literature. The
standard argument is that it better captures market prices than the female wage equation since
female labor supply is often conditional on the spouses’ labor market outcome. See e.g. O’Neill
(2003).
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0.1469 log points from the first to the second period. Model I estimates the impact
of changes in the human capital endowment which is found to be influential in
reducing the gender gap in earlier research.4 This model includes variables on
the educational background (measured by years of schooling and tertiary degree),
potential experience and its square and regional variables indicating whether the
individual lives in Gaza, an urban area or a camp.5 For the case of the Palestinian
Territories almost no change in the male-female wage gap can be explained by
changes in the human capital endowment of women relative to men. Relying on this
benchmark model, the narrowing gender gap would thus be ascribed to changes in
returns to endowment. In particular, returns to schooling - but also cross-gender
price adjustments for regional provenance - would be reported to be responsible
for the female wage catch-up. More specifically, the change in returns to schooling
in favor of women would account for 55 percent of the closing wage differential.
Integrating occupational and sectoral differences into the estimation model as done
in Model II is a necessary improvement when assessing the gender wage gap.6
When structural differences in sector and occupation choice between women and
men are acknowledged, most of the change in the male-female wage differential
can be explained by a compositional effect. A highly potential predictor for the
narrowing gender wage gap is the changing sectoral composition which accounts
for as much as 26.5 percent of the closing wage differential between male and
female workers. The strongest explanatory, however, is the change in the workplace.
The shift from labor employed in Israel to labor employed in the local labor market
reduces the gender wage gap by 57.8 percent. The estimated price effect on the
other hand is found to be most substantial for sectoral identifiers. Changes in the
relative price for female labor reduce the wage differential by 23 percent - after
controlling for compositional changes across sectors and compositional changes
of the workplace. The change in returns to schooling in favor of women in this
model contributes only 6.9 percent to the narrowing wage differential. The change
in relative prices on specific professional groups (as stated in Table 5.2) explains
10.6 percent of the relative wage gain of women.7 Note also, that some change in
unobserved characteristics seems to widen the wage gap between male and female
workers. However, this effect is small and largely off-set by compositional and
price effects of changes in the industry structure, occupational changes and shifts
4Blau and Kahn (1997) find for the U.S. that the observed change in human capital explains between
11.2 and 52.0 percent of the narrowing gender wage gap depending on the women’s skill level.
5The reference categories are thus individuals living in the West Bank and rural areas, respectively.
6This suggestion was made by many authors using different measures of job diversity. See e.g.
Blau and Kahn (1997); O’Neill (2003); Bacolod and Blum (2010); Black and Spitz-Oener (2010);
Yamaguchi (2013). The underlying wage regressions to Model II can be found in Table 5.7 in the
Appendix.
7This analysis could be refined if there were more precise data on specific job tasks. It is likely
that the contribution of these price effects are even overestimated since changes in the returns to
schooling but also to certain professions can be explained by diverse job tasks. For this strand of
research see e.g. Bacolod and Blum (2010), Black and Spitz-Oener (2010).
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in the workplace.
5.5 Border Policy, Labor Demand and Gender Wage Trend
With the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the year 2000 the Israeli authorities
enhance stricter border policies. This results in less labor mobility across the
Palestinian-Israeli border. The Palestinian labor market shrinks to the local one,
narrowing employment opportunities and changing dramatically the sectoral com-
position. Results from Section 5.4 indicate that changes in the sectoral composition
play an essential role in explaining the narrowing male-female wage differential.
This section therefore aims at i) shedding light on how shifts in the sector-workplace
structure influence gender-specific labor demand and ii) identifying which sectors
gain or lose relative importance with the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Up-
rising. According to economic theory changes in relative demand are positively
correlated with changes in relative wages. Adopting a simple equilibrium model
suggested by Katz and Murphy (1992) I calculate the log change of overall demand
for female (k = f emale) and male (k = male) labor as follows:
∆Dk =∑
j
Sjk(∆Sj/Sk) (5.2)
where Sjk is gender k’s share of labor employed in cell j in period T1 and j indicates
the sector-workplace cells. ∆Sj indicates the difference between the period after and
before the outbreak of the Second Intifada of the share of total labor employed in
cell j. Finally, Sk refers to the gender-specific share of total employment in period T1.
Table 5.4: Log Labor Demand Changes
MEN WOMEN
overall -0.0448 0.1908
between wp -0.0238 0.1069
within wp -0.0210 0.0839
Table 5.4 presents the estimates for the change in the overall labor demand using
Equation 5.2 with j representing 12 sector-workplace cells. Between-workplace
demand changes are calculated using Equation 5.2 where j indexes the two pos-
sible workplaces. They describe the extent to which border closures affect labor
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mobility of Palestinian workers. Within workplace demand changes are simply
the difference between overall and between demand changes. They thus express
the change in labor demand due to changes in the sectoral structure net of the
workplace effect. The overall demand for male labor is reduced over the Second
Intifada. On the contrary, the labor demand for women strongly increases. It is
interesting to note that more than half of the overall demand changes occur due to
a between-workplace demand change. Thus, a substantial part of both, the decrease
of the demand for male labor and the increase of the demand for female labor, can
be explained by the limited work mobility across the Israeli-Palestinian border.
Table 5.5 reveals several interesting facts about the gender-specific distribution
of employment across sector-workplace cells - each of which playing a role in
explaining the rising relative demand for female labor indicated in Table 5.4. In
each cell the female employment share is lower than the male one. Additionally, in
each sector the share of Palestinian women working in Israel is substantially lower
than the share of Palestinian men commuting. This explains why the workplace
shift from Israel to the local labor market with the Second Intifada negatively affects
male labor demand as seen in Table 5.4. Most of the Palestinian women work in
agriculture or in services and are mainly active in the local labor market. While
women are also engaged in manufacturing and in commerce in the local labor
market, female labor participation in construction and transport is neglectable.
Table 5.5: Gender Employment Share by Sector-Workplace Cell
MEN WOMEN
Work in Work in
Palestine Israel Palestine Israel
agriculture 0.5068 0.9138 0.4932 0.0861
manufacture 0.8170 0.9761 0.1830 0.0239
construction 0.9949 0.9979 0.0051 0.0021
commerce 0.9066 0.9883 0.0934 0.0116
transport 0.9862 0.9917 0.0137 0.0083
service 0.7517 0.8875 0.2483 0.1125
The above listed facts about the gender-specific distribution of labor can be
related to the observed employment shifts over workplace and sectors that followed
the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Those shifts are presented in Table 5.6. The
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Table 5.6: Sector-Workplace Employment Shifts
1996-1999 2001-2005 difference
Palestine Israel Palestine Israel Palestine Israel
agriculture 0.1130 0.0172 0.1587 0.0088 0.0457 -0.0084
manufacture 0.1127 0.0249 0.0897 0.0160 -0.0229 -0.0089
construction 0.0766 0.1105 0.0666 0.0413 -0.0100 -0.0692
commerce 0.1453 0.0209 0.1539 0.0107 0.0086 -0.0102
transport 0.0502 0.0033 0.0567 0.0017 0.0065 -0.0015
service 0.3124 0.0130 0.3889 0.0070 0.0764 -0.0060
relative employment between these cells change in favor of employment in the
service sector and agriculture in the Palestinian Territories. The employment share
of workers in manufacturing and construction in the Palestinian local labor market
shrinks. The relative employment of Palestinian workers in Israel is generally
decreased. The strongest reduction is observed in the Israeli construction sector.
All the sector-workplace changes stated above, but in particular the increase in
employment of local agriculture and services and the decrease in the constructions
in Israel, favor the female workforce. Sectors which sustain the Palestinian labor
market in times of political instability happen to be sectors with a high intensity in
female labor. Within the Palestinian society women seem to take over secure jobs
inside the Palestinian Territories which guarantee a constant but low pay relative
to jobs held in Israel. Men, on the other hand, increase their pay by commuting to
workplaces across the border but risk zero pay in ‘bad’ times. In these periods the
labor market activity of women gains importance in securing households’ income.
5.6 Conclusions
This work analyzes the gender wage trend in the Palestinian Territories before
and during the Second Palestinian Uprising. First, I quantify the unadjusted wage
gap between male and female Palestinian workers over the period from 1996 to
2006. I find that the wage differential between male and female workers in Gaza
and the West Bank increased till 1999. Interestingly, this trend is reversed with
the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising in September 2000 and rapidly
approaches zero at the end of the observation period. Second, I assess how much
of the change in the male-female wage differential can be attributed to changes
N. SwedChapter 5. Gender Wage Gap and the Second Palestinian Uprising 82
in workers’ characteristics relative to changes in the workers’ composition. I find
that the reversed wage trend in favor of female workers can be explained by both a
change in relative prices of observed characteristics of male and female workers but
also by a change in the workers’ composition. Price effects in favor of women can
be found in returns to schooling, occupation and sector affiliation. The larger effect,
however, can be attributed to compositional changes, more specifically to relative
employment shifts across workplaces and sectors. Reinforced border policies after
the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising reduce the share of Palestinian labor
employed in Israel and at the same time change the industry mix of Palestinian
labor. The shift from employment in Israel to employment in the local labor
market explains 57.8 percent of the closing wage gap between men and women.
The related change in the sectoral composition explains another 26.5 percent of
the wage convergence. Contrary to empirical findings on developed countries,
human capital formation does not explain the narrowing wage gap in Palestinian
Territories from 1996 to 2006. Third, I use a simple equilibrium framework to
analyze sector-workplace shifts that accompanied the Second Palestinian Uprising.
Both the change in sectoral composition and the change in workplace composition
are found to favor female employment. In periods of low conflict it is mainly
male Palestinian labor which profits from higher wages in Israel. This is because
employment opportunities for Palestinian workers in Israel predominantly exist
in occupations which comprise physical strength - an occupational field in which
male labor is favored over female. An analysis of the sector-workplace composition
reveals that with the outbreak of the Second Intifada employment in the local labor
market gains relative importance. Sectors that withstand the political distress are
the service and agricultural sectors located in Gaza and West Bank whereas the
construction sector located in Israel loses employment. All these compositional
changes largely favor female employment since the local agriculture and service
sectors are the ones with the highest share of female employment. The labor
demand for women increases by an estimated total of 19 percent while the demand
for male labor decreases by 4.5 percent. The womens’ gain in labor demand thus
explains a substantial part of the observed narrowing wage differences between
men and women. The sectors which sustain the Palestinian economy in times of
political distress happen to be the ones that benefit female labor. A policy maker
which is interested in protecting the economy against political shocks and at the
same time wishes to enhance gender equality in the labor market should thus focus
on the agricultural and service sectors in the local market. Relating the results
from this work to findings from Rendall (2013) economic policies that strengthen
“brain”- rather than “brawn”-intensive industries, however, seem more promissing
in raising women’s labor market outcomes.
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5.7 Appendix
Table 5.7: Wage Regressions
male female male female
T1 T1 T2 T2
university degree 0.0272 0.0297 0.0291 0.1188
[0.0062] [0.0166] [0.0056] [0.0138]
years of schooling 0.0225 0.0418 0.0266 0.0400
[0.0007] [0.0024] [0.0007] [0.0020]
experience 0.0205 0.0131 0.0149 0.0086
[0.0006] [0.0014] [0.0006] [0.0011]
experience2 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
urban -0.0092 0.0130 0.0321 0.0895
[0.0039] [0.0097] [0.0037] [0.0074]
camp -0.0316 -0.0026 0.0127 0.0462
[0.0051] [0.0132] [0.0044] [0.0093]
Gaza -0.0874 -0.0191 -0.1522 -0.0465
[0.0039] [0.0106] [0.0035] [0.0076]
work in Israel 0.5046 0.5366 0.5845 0.5950
[0.0044] [0.0222] [0.0049] [0.0241]
manufacturing 0.1401 0.1058 0.2549 -0.0015
[0.0106] [0.0454] [0.0097] [0.0370]
construction 0.3325 0.4635 0.3885 0.3239
[0.0096] [0.0622] [0.0089] [0.0646]
commerce 0.2073 0.3568 0.2465 0.1044
[0.0108] [0.0427] [0.0100] [0.0386]
transport 0.1083 0.3787 0.1919 0.1821
[0.0140] [0.0614] [0.0121] [0.0505]
service 0.0680 0.2155 0.2468 0.1512
[0.0104] [0.0365] [0.0087] [0.0304]
legislators, managers 0.4543 0.2174 0.4768 0.2774
[0.0119] [0.0307] [0.0100] [0.0229]
professionals, technical workers 0.1896 0.0620 0.2298 0.0618
[0.0067] [0.0237] [0.0058] [0.0172]
salesmen 0.0719 0.0200 0.0867 0.0157
[0.0075] [0.0293] [0.0059] [0.0228]
skilled agricultural workers 0.0334 0.1743 0.0382 0.2238
[0.0197] [0.1013] [0.0222] [0.1381]
craft & related trade workers 0.1722 0.0191 0.1803 0.0359
[0.0049] [0.0340] [0.0055] [0.0284]
machine operators 0.1514 0.1851 0.1251 -0.0474
[0.0078] [0.0641] [0.0069] [0.0296]
constant 3.1826 2.7822 2.9516 2.7521
[0.0134] [0.0388] [0.0121] [0.0330]
adj R2 0.497 0.316 0.448 0.333
N 36628 5308 47133 10099
Note: T1 and T2 specify years before and after the Second Intifada, respectively.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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